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Experts agree that the nation’s chemical facilities are attractive targets for 
terrorists. This consensus is due to several conditions. First, there are thousands of 
facilities scattered across the country that use, manufacture or store large stockpiles of 
toxic and/or flammable substances. Many sites are clustered together in densely 
populated areas and are poorly protected. If terrorists cause catastrophic chemical 
releases or explosions at these key facilities, large numbers of Americans will be put at 
risk of injury or death. Second, such attacks may also have a devastating impact on the 
U.S. economy because so many other industries are dependent on a properly functioning 
chemical sector. Surprisingly in light of these risks, most chemical sites have not 
implemented sufficient measures to prevent, mitigate, deter, and/or respond to terrorist 
attacks. Although governmental entities (local, state and federal) and the chemical 
industry have initiated some safeguards, they only apply to a limited number of chemical 
facilities. The vast majority is still not adequately prepared for terrorism.  
This thesis proposes that private and public sectors should partner together to 
improve the preparedness of the chemical industry for terrorist acts. More specifically, 
key stakeholders from both sectors need to forge Regional Defense Units (RDUs). Their 
primary purpose is to effectively reduce the attractiveness of local chemical facilities as 
targets for terrorists without unduly hampering their operations. To achieve this goal, a 
mixture of mandates (“sticks”) and incentives (“carrots”) need to be regionally 
developed, implemented and sustained by RDUs. Collaborative regional efforts using an 
appropriately balanced and community-governed “carrot and stick” approach can be the 
most effective option for the Department of Homeland Security to improve chemical 
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A. INTRODUCTION  
The events of September 11, 2001, ushered in a new paradigm for many 
Americans. In an instant, the threat of terrorism became the top public concern. 
Accordingly, it became necessary for government to identify and prioritize the country’s 
vulnerable critical infrastructure. Afterwards, both the private and public sectors began to 
initiate efforts to safeguard the nation’s highest risk targets.  
It has been almost five years since 9/11, and many of the nation’s most critical 
infrastructure vulnerabilities have been mitigated. However, little has been done to 
reduce the attractiveness of chemical facilities as targets of terrorism, even though some 
experts believe they are America’s Achilles’ heel. The fact that there are tens of 
thousands of chemical facilities scattered across the nation exacerbates this issue. Yet, 
there is not a national approach to chemical facility preparedness. Another problem is that 
sites are almost exclusively owned by the private sector. In addition, few mandates 
require owners/operators to institute safeguards, and incentives to do so are almost 
nonexistent. A final complicating factor is that the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) is the lead federal agency for the chemical sector, but they do not have the 
statutory authority to require implementation of preparedness measures. Obviously, this 
lack of enforcement power restricts what DHS can accomplish. Given these conditions, 
how can the Department of Homeland Security ensure owners/operators of chemical 
facilities take the necessary actions to reduce the attractiveness of their sites as weapons 
of mass destruction?      
 
B. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
Government officials and industry observers agree the chemical sector constitutes 
a desirable target for terrorists. This point of consensus is based on several reasons. First, 
so many of the industry’s facilities are extremely vulnerable to attack because of poor 
security. In fact, in a recent government report site security was described as ranging 
2 
from fair to very poor.1 Some believe that even unsophisticated strikes on facilities have 
high probability of success. Second, hundreds of chemical sites are immediately adjacent 
to or located within highly populated areas. Because of this situation, a catastrophic 
chemical release or explosion at these facilities could kill thousands or tens of thousands 
of Americans. Third, a chemical plant attack could have devastating impacts on the U.S. 
economy because many other critical infrastructure sectors are extremely dependent on a 
functioning chemical industry for raw materials. Fourth, chemical facilities are often 
clustered together in industrial districts or near shipping ports. Therefore, an attack on 
one could set off a chain reaction of explosions at nearby plants and have a disastrous 
impact on trade. The final reason may involve symbolism. Terrorists may strike chemical 
sites (e.g., refineries) to send a symbolic message. Many believe that this rationale was 
the primary reason behind the thwarted White House/U.S. Capitol and successful 
Pentagon attacks.          
Despite these risks, most chemical sites have not implemented adequate measures 
to prevent, mitigate, deter and/or respond to terrorist attacks. To make matters worse, 
nationwide mandates requiring all chemical facilities to assess their vulnerabilities to 
terrorism and to take steps to reduce them do not exist. Also, no government agency has 
comprehensively assessed the vulnerability of chemical facilities across the nation.2 
Although various levels of government and the chemical industry itself have initiated 
some security-related measures, they only apply to a limited number of chemical 
facilities. Most are still not adequately safeguarded. Glaring vulnerabilities continue to 
exist at sites, placing huge segments of the public in needless danger.  
In an attempt to resolve this problem, several alternatives have been suggested. 
However, to date little substantive action has been taken to adequately reduce the 
attractiveness of chemical facilities as targets of terrorism. Therefore, the time has now 
come for the federal government to determine what steps to pursue to regulate the 
industry. But, how can the government effectively accomplish this goal without 
                                                 
1 John Stephenson, “Federal Action Needed to Address Security Challenges at Chemical Facilities,” 
GAO Report to Congress (Washington D.C.: General Accounting Office, February 23, 2004), 8. 
2 John Stephenson, “Federal and Industry Efforts Are Addressing Security Issues at Chemical 
Facilities, but Additional Action Is Needed,” GAO Report to Congress (Washington D.C.: General 
Accounting Office, April 27, 2005), 8. 
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significantly hindering the productivity, trade, or economic growth of an industry that 
officials are so dependent on for jobs, tax revenue, and moreover votes?     
1. The Relevance of This Problem 
Determining how U.S. officials should move forward will ultimately yield several 
practical benefits. The most obvious advantage is that chemical facilities will become 
better protected against acts of terrorism by deterring or preventing attacks. If an attack 
on a site is successful, however, its consequences could be mitigated if the research 
findings are implemented. For example, when working to resolve the research question, a 
review of disaster response and recovery efforts is likely. In all probability, this review 
will eventually identify areas that need improvement.  
Conceptually speaking, resolving the research question may have applications that 
extend beyond the chemical sector. Findings could serve to form a template for how other 
critical infrastructure sectors, facilities, etc., facing the same or similar problems should 
proceed. In addition, efforts to resolve the research question could help to answer the 
larger theoretical question, who is in charge when it comes to critical infrastructure 
protection?3  
2. Thesis 
Nearly five years after the events of September 11, 2001, many of our nation’s 
most dangerous chemical facilities remain inadequately prepared for acts of terrorism. 
Two primary reasons influence this situation. First, few requirements exist regarding how 
chemical facilities should be secured. For the most part, protection at many sites remains 
solely a corporate decision. Second, inefficiencies are present within the marketplace that 
fail to encourage the implementation of necessary safeguards. In other words, few 
incentives exist to motivate owners/operators of chemical facilities to sufficiently protect 
their sites. In order to remedy these problems, the following policy should be pursued: 
• Enact federal legislation that provides DHS with statutory authority to 
ensure the attractiveness of chemical facilities as targets for terrorists is  
 
 
                                                 
3 Dr. Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection In Homeland Security: Defending A Networked 
Nation, (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 73.  
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reduced to an acceptable level. To achieve this outcome, the new 
legislation must assert that DHS has to collaborate with the private and 
public sectors.  
• Establish ongoing Regional Defense Units (RDUs) to aid DHS with 
accomplishing the new mandate. 
• Utilize RDUs to craft, implement, and sustain regional chemical facility 
preparedness efforts.  
3. Literature Review 
As a whole, government officials are responsible for the vast majority of 
authoritative literature that exists relating to chemical facility preparedness. Other 
contributing sources include trade associations, industry experts, news agencies, think-
tanks and environmental groups. Although all of these contributors have varying 
perspectives, there are some points of agreement among them. For example, most sources 
believe that catastrophic releases of toxic and/or flammable airborne agents from 
chemical facilities would cause many deaths. But the range of likely fatalities is of great 
debate. This lack of consensus represents a significant distraction to the discussion of 
how the federal government should proceed to reduce the attractiveness of chemical 
plants as targets for terrorists. Fueling the debate are disagreements about how to improve 
chemical facility protection. Even though this dispute is ongoing, there is widespread 
agreement among think-tanks like the Brookings Institute and intelligence sources from 
the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Justice that chemical sites are 
likely terrorist targets.  
As proof of how deadly a chemical disaster can be, one only needs to review the 
history of such incidents. For example, in 1984, in Bhopal, India, a devastating accidental 
release of a toxic gas cloud from a Union Carbide plant killed almost 4,000 people and 
injured an estimated 150,000-600,000.4 Although this incident did not occur in the U.S., 
it served as the impetus for the passage of a series of new laws, including amendments to 
the Clean Air Act (CAA). Among other things, the new CAA changes require each 
facility with a designated minimum amount of certain toxic and/or flammable substances 
                                                 
4 Stephenson, “Federal and Industry Efforts Are Addressing Security Issues,” 7.    
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to develop a Risk Management Plan (RMP). The RMP has to contain an off-site 
consequence analysis of an accidental release that entails a worst-case scenario. In it, the 
number of people considered “affected” by a worst-case release must be identified.  
According to EPA data, 123 chemical facilities located throughout the nation have 
toxic “worst-case” scenarios where more than one million people could be at risk of 
exposure to a cloud of toxic gas.5 Also, about 600 sites could each potentially threaten 
between 100,000 and a million people, and about 2,300 plants could each potentially 
affect between 10,000 and 100,000 people within these facilities’ vulnerable zones 
(described below).6       
Most government officials, think-tanks and media personnel use an RMP’s worst 
case scenario (i.e., the number of people affected) as THE standard for evaluating the 
lethality of a site. Some Department of Homeland Security documents and CRS Reports, 
however, suggest that this benchmark is not appropriate because it overstates the number 
of people that would actually be impacted. These proponents point out that the number of 
people considered affected in an RMP is calculated by drawing a circle around the plant. 
The radius (e.g., dispersion distance) of this circle is determined to be the distance a toxic 
vapor cloud, heat from a fire, or blast wave from an explosion could travel from the 
facility before dissipating to the point that serious injuries from short-term exposures 
would no longer occur.7 All those inside this circle or vulnerable zone are considered to 
be affected, which according to the EPA means anything from minor injuries to death. 
Industry proponents state that it is improper to assume that everyone in the vulnerable 
zone would be affected. This camp claims that in reality only those who are in the plume 
area (e.g., wedge shaped region within the vulnerable zone) would be impacted by a 
chemical release. Accordingly, since the plume area is much smaller than the vulnerable 
zone, the number of individuals actually affected would be considerably less than what is 
indicated in the RMP’s worst-case scenario.  
                                                 
5 John Stephenson, “Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of 
Security Preparedness Is Unknown,” GAO Report to Congress (Washington D.C.: General Accounting 
Office, March 23, 2003), 4. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Stephenson, “Federal and Industry Efforts Are Addressing Security Issues,” 9. 
6 
On the other hand, many opponents such as environmental groups and some in 
government believe that RMPs’ worst-case scenarios underestimate the number of people 
that could be affected. They claim this discrepancy occurs because of the EPA’s loose 
definition of a worst-case scenario. It is defined as the maximum quantities of release 
from the rupture of the single largest vessel, or process line at a facility.8 Opponents feel 
that this definition is not inclusive enough. They demand that a worst-case scenario 
should encompass a catastrophic release of much more than the contents of only one 
vessel or process line. As demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks, terrorists are likely to strike 
multiple targets during a coordinated effort. Therefore, by only considering the loss of 
one vessel or process line, this camp claims an RMP’s worst-case scenario is not really a 
worst-case scenario. They argue that in order to more accurately assess the number of 
those affected by a catastrophic chemical release or explosion, the rupture of all 
containers should be included.   
Although there is some disagreement regarding the accuracy of RMPs’ worst-case 
scenarios, there remains a general consensus that many chemical facilities pose a clear 
and present danger that terrorists might want to exploit. For example, a 2002 Brookings 
Institute report ranks attacks on toxic chemical plants behind only biological and atomic 
attacks in terms of possible fatalities.9 Most observers agree that terrorists face extreme 
difficulties when attempting to carry out biological or atomic attacks, but the same cannot 
be said for strikes on chemical facilities. As in the 9/11 attacks, terrorists could simply 
convert our productive assets into weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, in 2002, 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency warned during testimony of the potential 
for an attack by al-Qaeda on chemical facilities.10 Even the Justice Department has 
concluded that the risk of terrorists attempting in the foreseeable future to cause an 
industrial chemical release is both “real and credible.”11  
                                                 
8 Stephenson, “Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemical Facilities,” 10.  
9 Michael E. O’Hanlon, Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis, (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2002), 7. 
10 Stephenson, “Federal Action Needed,” 6.  
11 Stephenson, “Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way,” 9. 
7 
The U.S. chemical industry booms as a $450 billion annual business. It directly 
employs more than 1,000,000 workers and indirectly about 5,000,000.12 The chemical 
sector supplies key outputs used to manufacture other crucial products (fuels, medicines, 
drinking water, etc.).  The operation of many other critical infrastructure assets relies on 
the chemical industry remaining functional. This connection is so apparent that nearly all 
of the sources reviewed agree that a catastrophic attack on key chemical sites could have 
devastating ripple effects on other sectors. In all likelihood, many critical operations 
would grind to a halt, crippling the economy. A small glimpse of this interdependency 
was seen just after 9/11. Rail transportation of many hazardous materials including 
chlorine was disrupted in some states following the attacks, because of concerns about 
the potential for an intentional chemical release by terrorists.13 This temporary stoppage 
of rail service impacted drinking water facilities that relied on chlorine delivered by rail 
to purify water.14          
A vast majority of experts in the chemical industry believe current security 
conditions at most chemical facilities are insufficient. But, how much more security 
should there be? Who should be responsible for providing additional security? What are 
the best ways to implement and sustain new preparedness measures? These are just a few 
of the central questions that many of the literature sources attempt to answer.  
When trying to answer the question of how much more security is needed, 
standard protocol dictates conducting site vulnerability assessments. This process 
involves a comprehensive analysis of a facility, which includes a review of its 
procedures, plans, processes, threats and risks. Completing a vulnerability assessment 
will, among other things, identify security weaknesses. These deficiencies are then 
usually addressed to further safeguard the site. Although this process sounds 
straightforward, it is not. For example, an array of vulnerability assessment 
                                                 
12 American Chemistry Council, Protecting a Nation: Homeland Defense and the Business of 
Chemistry, April 2002, http://www.americanchemistry.com/s_acc/sec_article.asp?CID=26&DID=1218 
(Accessed July 22, 2005). 
13 Jim Kouri, “Preventing Terrorist Attacks at Chemical Facilities,” Men’s Daily News Home Page, 
May 6, 2005, http://mensnewsdaily.com/blog/kouri/2005/05/preventing-terrorist-attacks-at.html (Accessed 
June 10, 2005). 
14 Ibid.    
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methodologies is presently available, with more being developed every day. Depending 
on which methodology is used, varying outcomes are produced. Some have suggested 
that this situation could lead to a particular methodology being employed solely because 
it yields advantageous results for plant owners/operators, instead of the most accurate 
results. In order to overcome this problem, the Justice Department developed a single 
methodology that all facility managers can use. It is the DOJ’s position that using one 
methodological tool will help remove bias and allow vulnerability assessment 
comparisons to be made across various chemical facility types (i.e., petroleum, chlorine, 
synthetic oils, etc.). But, facility managers and trade associations alike argue that a 
vulnerability assessment designed for a specific type of chemical plant would be optimal. 
They dismiss the “one size fits all” approach as it does not consider the key differences 
among various types of chemical facilities. 
The bulk of the literature identifies the private sector as shouldering the majority 
of responsibility for providing additional preparedness measures at the nation’s chemical 
facilities.  This rationale seems entirely appropriate since the private sector owns the vast 
majority (85%) of critical infrastructure, which encompasses chemical facilities.15 Even 
the National Strategy for Homeland Security states that the private sector bears “primary 
and substantial responsibility for addressing the public risks posed by their 
industries…”16 There is, however, a call by industry for financial assistance from 
government to help cover some protection-related costs. Also, with regard to assigning 
responsibility to the private sector, consistent themes appear in the literature. Most 
government sources advocate that the public and private sectors should partner to develop 
the most cost-effective and comprehensive strategy to reduce the attractiveness of 
chemical facilities as targets of terrorism.  
Several potential solutions to the issues described above emerge in the available 
literature. Those that merit evaluation fall into three broadly based categories. First, some 
observers believe that the chemical industry should be allowed to continue with its 
                                                 
15 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: Norton, 
2004), 398.  
16 The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington D.C.: Office of Homeland Security, 
February 2002), 33. 
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voluntary approach to the problem. The principal parties who subscribe to and advocate 
continuing this approach are plant officials, industry lobbyists and trade associations. 
Their position appears in industry newsletters, websites, journals and government reports 
(e.g., CSR, CBO, etc.). This group promotes the idea that market forces are sufficient to 
protect chemical facilities from terrorism without outside interference. As proof, they 
point to an array of voluntary efforts already instituted by the chemical industry to bolster 
plant security, especially since 9/11. In fact, according to the industry’s largest trade 
association, the American Chemistry Council (ACC) its members have spent over $2 
billion safeguarding their sites following September 11, 2001.17 In addition, the ACC 
says more actions are forthcoming and that the trade association will continue to work 
with DHS to prevent chemical facilities and their products from being used to harm 
anyone.18  
Second, there are those who believe that voluntary efforts and current 
requirements alone are not sufficient to adequately protect the nation’s chemical facilities 
from terrorism.19 This group is largely comprised of environmental organizations, 
industry activists, emergency responders and some political leaders. They promote 
relying heavily on mandates to force plant officials to abide by a laundry list of tasks. 
Most of these tasks revolve around fortifying sites. The group’s promotion of tighter 
restrictions is well recorded in various congressional testimony reports. These proponents 
state that this kind of regulation could mitigate lax security that continues at most 
chemical facilities, which they assert plant owners/operators refuse to properly address. 
Their claims appear to have some validity according to news reports, undercover 
investigations and cursory government inspection at several key facilities where security 
was found lacking.20 This camp argues that without mandates, any added protective 
measures by the industry will likely not be effective. As a model for what stringent 
requirements can yield, supporters point to the high level of security at the nation’s 
                                                 
17 American Chemical Industry, “ACC Supports Federal Chemical Security Legislation,” October 
2004, http://www.americanchemistry.com/s_acc/sec_policyissues.asp?CID=329&DID=1156 (Accessed 
July 9, 2005).   
18 Ibid.  
19 Stephenson, “Federal and Industry Efforts Are Addressing Security Issues,” 14.  
20 Stephenson, “Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way,” 11.  
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nuclear and high-risk port facilities, which they consider as adequately “hardened.” They 
believe the same security can be achieved in the chemical industry. Their strategy 
primarily relies on mandates to force chemical facilities to improve protection of sites 
with “guns, guards and gates.”  
A third group believes that neither course of action will effectively solve the 
problem. Instead, they argue for the need to create regional partnerships between the 
private and public sectors. It is recommended that these new “teams” work 
collaboratively with the Department of Homeland Security to reduce the attractiveness of 
chemical facilities as targets of terrorism. In short, key stakeholders should join together 
to define and craft an approach to ensure achievement of the desired outcome. Some 
industry experts and government officials promote this approach. They suggest that this 
cooperative solution will yield a more comprehensive and effective long-term result. 
Their claims have been made during several congressional hearings related to chemical 
facility protection. The National Strategy for Homeland Security, National Infrastructure 
Preparedness Plan (NIPP) and a series of CRS reports support this position. In addition, 
a joint approach is the foundation for the Department of Homeland Security’s Free and 
Secure Trade (FAST) program, Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program.21 All three establish private-public 
partnerships with the aid of incentives and mandates that improve shipping security and 
reduce inspection time.  
The three courses of action described above emerge as the most likely alternatives 
to be implemented for several reasons. The first option (voluntary approach) enjoys 
strong industry-wide support since it is the current strategy and has been for decades. 
Policies, procedures and personnel are already in place to support this approach. It 
requires the least amount of change. The second option is viable because it has been 
successfully used in other areas to resolve similar problems. Furthermore, since 9/11, 
dominant themes in government espouse legislating remedies to homeland security 
issues. In fact, in every year since 2001, a national chemical facility security-related act 
                                                 
21 U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. International Trade and Freight Transportation Trends, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003). Appendix A, 
http://www.bts.gov/publications/us_international_trade_and_freight_transportation_trends/2003/html/appe
ndix_a.html (Accessed June 16, 2006).  
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has been introduced. Margins of defeat for these bills are growing smaller with the 
passage of time. The third course of action is a practical solution for two reasons. First, it 
has key support from the Department for Homeland Security, and it is promoted in 
several government documents (CRS Reports, CBO papers, National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, NIPP, etc.). Also, creating partnerships among stakeholders sets the 
stage for effective cooperation, communication, innovation and collaboration that could 
produce “win-win” outcomes for both the private and public sectors. For these reasons, 
analyses of all three alternatives will be conducted to determine an effective course of 
action for policy.           
4. Unexplored Areas 
Although the literature is exhaustive in both breadth and depth, some unknown 
areas persist. For example, few sources address the topic of securing the transport of 
chemicals. It is as if hazardous chemicals magically and safely flow to and from facilities. 
Clearly this area deserves further investigation because if facilities do eventually become 
better prepared for attacks, a viable next alternative for terrorists is to target chemicals in 
transit. Thus efforts to protect chemical facilities may merely shift, or displace the 
terrorist threat to other vulnerable targets (transport vehicles, holding tanks, railroad cars, 
etc.) that move chemicals. That scenario happened a few years ago at Israel’s largest 
fueling station in Tel Aviv. Terrorists attached an explosive device to an unsecured 
tractor-trailer truck during the night while the driver was asleep.22 The perpetrators chose 
this tactic primarily because the facility had very tight security.23 The next morning, as 
the truck entered the fortified site, the improvised explosive device (IED) was detonated.       
Another area receiving little attention in the literature is that few sources 
exhaustively explore the likely effects of successful terrorist attacks on chemical 
facilities. Instead of conducting this kind of comprehensive and technical research, 
industry observers rely on two readily available sources to assess possible impacts. First, 
experts use the previously noted incident in Bhopal, India, for providing the standard 
model for understanding the actual consequences of a large-scale U.S. chemical release. 
                                                 
22 David Rudge, Ben-Eliezer Warns of Bombing Wave, Israelfacts.org, May 27, 2002, 
https://www.synapsenow.com/synapse/news/fullstory_public.cfm?articleid=4576&website=israelfacts.org 
(Accessed April 5, 2006).  
23 Ibid.  
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Some claim significant problems exist with the Bhopal model. For example, the plant 
where that incident occurred did not have the mitigating systems in place that facilities in 
the U.S. possess.24 In addition, many of those killed in Bhopal lived in a shanty town 
immediately adjacent to the release site. Therefore, the outcome most likely encountered 
in America from a similar chemical release would be drastically different than what was 
experienced in India over 20 years ago. Second, many in the field use the RMPs’ worst-
case scenarios to determine probable consequences of chemical releases. As already 
mentioned, however, the underlying technical assumptions built into the worst-case 
scenarios contain several problems. As a result, the accuracy of their projections is highly 
suspect. It seems clear that more efforts should be directed at thoroughly calculating the 
realistic consequences of terrorist attacks on chemical facilities. Until risks are accurately 
known, priorities cannot be properly established. Therefore, it is critical that, to the extent 
possible, a program be developed to assess the likely consequences of terrorist attacks on 
chemical sites. If actions are taken before this step is complete, it may result in the 
proverbial mistake of “putting the cart before the horse.”  
Another topic that rarely appears in the literature has to do with managing the 
human element of security. Most research seems to assume attacks will emanate from 
outside rather than inside. But, “While fighting the enemy without, we must not forget 
the enemy within.”25 The few references to preventing “insider” attacks that do exist 
simply suggest conducting thorough pre-employment background investigations of key 
personnel, as well as periodic reviews. This process is primarily intended to screen out 
high-risk employees who may one day become saboteurs. Little consideration is given to 
preventing workers from unintentionally aiding attackers. It is generally assumed that 
these kinds of acts will not happen if appropriate security measures, procedures, 
technologies and systems are in place. Unfortunately, it does not matter how fortified the 
castle walls are if those who have the keys to the kingdom accidentally allow intruders 
inside.  
                                                 
24 Richard Farmer, “Homeland Security and the Private Sector,” Congressional Budget Office, 
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, December 2004), 24. 
25 Gary Ackerman and Chery Loeb, “Watch Out For America’s Own Extremists,” Christian Science 
Monitor Online, October 19, 2001, http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1019/p11s3-coop.html (Accessed May 
29, 2006).  
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Regardless of whatever protective steps are implemented, people remain 
instrumental to their effectiveness. Ultimately rules and technologies alone do not 
execute policies—individuals do. This dependency creates a major vulnerability because 
the human factor is truly security’s weakest link.26 This “chink in the armor” occurs for 
several reasons. First, people are susceptible to social engineering (e.g., being conned).27 
The public can misplace their trust if manipulated in certain ways.28 Social engineering is 
all about manipulation. It involves using the art of deception, influence and persuasion to 
gain access to protected assets. Social engineers persuade people to do things they would 
not normally do for strangers.29  
Second, developers are continually improving security technologies. These 
improvements make exploiting technical vulnerabilities more difficult. As this happens, 
the human element will increasingly be targeted. They become the weak underbelly of 
security. In short, because of technological advances, the focus of attacks will more often 
than not be directed at people rather than trying to actually defeat physical safeguards for 
unauthorized access. Consequently, strengthening the human component becomes more 
critical. But how can this pursuit effectively be achieved?   
According to limited research, education represents an organization’s best tool for 
controlling the human element of security.30 As a general rule, everyone needs to be 
trained since all are vulnerable to social engineering attacks. Every worker should receive 
a base level of training, and then each must also be trained based on his/her specific job 
assignment to adhere to certain protocols.31 People who work in sensitive areas should be 
given additional specialized training.32  
                                                 
26 Kevin Mitnick, The Art of Deception: Controlling the Human Element of Security, (Indianapolis, 
Indiana: Wiley Publishing, 2002), 3. 
27 Ibid., VII.  
28 Ibid., 41. 
29 Ibid., XI. 




As one noted security consultant said, “Security is not a product, it is a process.”33 
It involves policies, technologies, system configurations, and more importantly, people. 
The effectiveness of the entire process hinges on individuals. Since the human element is 
often the Achilles’ heel of security, special consideration needs to be paid to 
strengthening this weak link. For now, this goal is best achieved through education, but 
further research is needed.              
5. Methodology 
In an attempt to help determine the road ahead, a comparative methodology will 
be utilized. This approach will occur on two levels. The first level involves evaluating 
mandates used by local, state and federal officials to safeguard some chemical sites. Each 
has instituted laws or acts requiring certain preparedness actions to be implemented. This 
“stick” approach could also be used by the federal government and DHS to better prepare 
the nation’s chemical facilities for attack. However if this mechanism is selected, what 
should enacted mandates include? How specific and comprehensive should they be?  To 
answer these questions, as well as others, a review of current local, state and federal 
government efforts is needed because they vary considerably. Some statutes remain more 
prescriptive and far-reaching than others. Comparing the advantages and disadvantages 
of the various mandates will provide valuable clues as to the direction and potential 
effectiveness of a new federal approach for safeguarding the country’s chemical facilities.  
The second level involves conducting a review of incentive programs that could 
motivate the private sector to voluntarily reduce the attractiveness of their sites as targets 
of terrorism. The purpose of this evaluation is to identify what factors encourage facility 
operators to institute chemical facility preparedness measures. For example, local, state 
and federal officials use grants, tax incentives, early provision options, equivalency 
alternatives and outreach programs for plants, and other facilities, to motivate 
owners/operators to strengthen their security. In addition, the industry promotes improved 
facility preparedness through memberships in trade organizations. These same “carrots” 
could become part of an overarching national approach. However, given the capabilities, 
resources, and constraints of the private and private sectors, which and how much of each 
incentive approach would be most effective, if any? Resolving this question necessitates 
                                                 
33 Mitnick, Art of Deception, 4. 
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an evaluation of current voluntary and self-imposed efforts. The benefits and drawbacks 
of each carrot need to be weighed in light of the desired outcome.                   
Furthermore, a brief review of how analogous problems were resolved is 
included. Their solutions could provide some insight as to the likely success or failure of 
potential courses of action of how to reduce the attractiveness of chemical facilities as 
terrorist targets. For example, according to the literature, water purification and nuclear 
power facilities recently overcame some of the same kinds of issues now facing the 
chemical industry. Lessons from these efforts may be applicable to chemical facilities.   
Water purification sites typically store large amounts of chlorine. This chemical is 
used to prepare water for human consumption. Following 9/11, many observers found 
that nearly all purification plants are located in densely populated areas, and most have 
lax security. Since chlorine is an extremely toxic substance, many in Congress believe 
these sites should be better prepared for acts of terrorism. This concern led to the passage 
of the Public Health Security & Bioterrorism Preparedness & Response Act.  
Early on, the nuclear power facilities were recognized as extremely dangerous.  A 
catastrophic accident at one of these sites could threaten the lives of a large number of 
Americans. As a result, a governing board, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 
was established. Prescribing an elaborate set of physical protection guidelines that the 
industry has to follow is chief among the NRC’s duties. Examining these guidelines and 
evaluating their effectiveness could yield clues to for how policymakers should reduce 
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM  
A. CHEMICAL FACILITY HISTORY 
Chemical refineries were first introduced into the U.S. in the early 1920s. 
Initially, most were built along waterways to expedite the transportation of raw materials 
and refined products. At that time, only sparsely populated areas surrounded the newly 
constructed facilities. Most people were unaware of the dangers posed by this emerging 
sector and of the vulnerabilities that existed. That perception would soon change.     
1. Tragedy in Texas City, Texas 
On April 16, 1947, a French ship, the SS Grandcamp, docked in an industrial port 
in Texas City, Texas.34 The ship had 2,300 tons of ammonium nitrate fertilizer onboard 
when a fire ignited. The crew made futile attempts to extinguish the fire, but it ultimately 
reached the ship’s volatile cargo causing a massive explosion. The force of the blast was 
so strong it brought down two nearby aircraft and created a fifteen-foot tidal wave that 
swept through the port carrying debris and corpses with it.35 The explosion also triggered 
a series of cascading fires. As a result, several businesses were set ablaze including a 
nearby Monsanto chemical refinery. The company had 1.5 million barrels of petroleum 
products on-site that burned out of control for days. This fire created an enormous black 
cloud of soot which could be seen for miles around. When the dust settled 576 people 
were dead, including all 26 members of the local volunteer fire department, and 3,500 
were injured.36 Aggregate property loss amounted to almost $600 million in 1947 terms, 
equal to about $4 billion today.37 After this incident, some cargo handling procedures 
were modified, but for the most part the chemical industry operated as unusual.     
2. Federal Safety Efforts 
In the U.S., significant changes did not occur within the chemical sector until 
1970 when the federal government established the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The EPA sought 
                                                 
34 Mark Pandanell, The Texas City Disaster: April 16, 1947,  
http://www.local1259iaff.org/disaster.html (Accessed May 30, 2005).  
35 Ibid., 2.  
36 Ibid., 5. 
37 Ibid.  
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to protect the environment from pollution. OSHA focuses on “assuring, as far as possible, 
every working man and woman in the United States safe and healthful working 
conditions, and preserving our human resources.”38 Now, for the first time, there were 
regulations and minimum operating standards for chemical facilities to follow. On the 
downside, both federal agencies primarily target accidents, not intentional acts. 
Consequently, plant officials followed suit and focused on measures to make their 
facilities safer from accidents. Willful destructive actions were not given much attention. 
With everyone concentrating on accidents, it is not surprising that chemical facilities 
became safer places to work. In fact, every year since the establishment of the EPA and 
OSHA, the number of industrial workers killed on the job has steadily declined.39 
However, as ironic as it may seem, this improvement had a serious drawback. It gave the 
public the perception that chemical facilities were not dangerous. That belief would soon 
be called into question.  
3. The Catastrophe in Bhopal, India 
As mentioned earlier, in 1984 in Bhopal, India, a Union Carbide plant 
unintentionally released a toxic pesticide ingredient.40 As a result, a large toxic gas cloud 
quickly formed and passed through the city, killing almost 4,000 people and injuring 
another 150,000–600,000.41 Besides being deadly, this incident also had substantial 
monetary costs. Union Carbide eventually paid out an estimated half a billion dollars in 
compensatory damages to more than 566,000 survivors and dependents, including 
thousands of permanently disabled victims.42 Although this chemical release did not 
happen in the U.S., it served as the impetus for a series of actions by both the private and 
public sectors. But, these steps again narrowly focused both parties’ efforts towards 
reducing accidental releases or explosions. Preparing facilities for intentional acts, such 
                                                 
38 Lafayette Technical College, OSHA and Other Safety Regulations, 
http:www.lafayettecampus.net/lafayette/loss_prevention_manual/osha_and_safety_and_health.htm 
(Accessed June 19, 2005).  
39 Thomas Kniesner, Cato Handbook for the 105th Congres, (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Publishing 
Institute, 1996), http://cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-36.html (Accessed June 13, 2005).  
40 Farmer, “Homeland Security and the Private Sector,” 24. 
41 Ibid.   
42 Ibid.  
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as terrorism or sabotage, did not receive consideration. Preventing purposeful attacks 
would not attract significant attention until the tragic events of 9/11.           
4.. Private and Public Sector Responses to the Release in Bhopal 
Following the disaster in India, the private sector became involved in improving 
safeguards at chemical facilities. In particular, the country’s largest chemical industry 
trade association, the American Chemistry Council, developed and implemented the 
Responsible Care Code program.  Basically, its tenets call for participating chemical 
facilities to abide by a series of guidelines and a code of conduct. Some of the more 
salient points of the Responsible Care Code program require member facilities to assess 
and address their vulnerabilities. Afterwards, third party verifications of implemented 
security measures must occur. While these measures are steps in the right direction, most 
experts agree that the program does not go far enough. Leading this charge is slew of 
government officials, most notable of whom is the Governor Jon Corzine of New Jersey. 
More importantly, the Administrator of EPA and the Secretary of DHS have gone on the 
record as saying that voluntary efforts alone are insufficient to assure the public of 
industry’s preparedness.43 Organizations including the Environmental Health Watch 
group, Natural Resource Defense Council and the Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry support this position. Several government documents (GAO-05-631T, 
GAO-03-439, CBO Paper 12/04 and GAO-04-482T) and news reports have also raised 
serious concerns about the effectiveness of the Responsible Care Code program. This 
camp believes the program still falls short of the action needed to adequately reduce the 
attractiveness of chemical facilities as targets of terrorism. As proof, experts point to the 
fact that membership in the program is strictly voluntary, and most chemical facilities 
simply do not join. In fact, only approximately 7% of the nation’s 15,000 RMP facilities 
have adopted the Responsible Care Code program.44 In spite of the lack of participation, 
the industry and its trade associations still promote the program as THE model for how 
the sector can police itself. The Responsible Care Code is hailed by its proponents as the 
best alternative to legislative mandates, which they say will only create more bureaucratic 
red-tape without actually making plants, or the country, any safer. Opponents to the 
                                                 
43 Stephenson, “Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way,” 23. 
44 Ibid., 5.  
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program believe that its establishment allows industry groups to deflect calls for more 
stringent regulation of chemical facilities. This stalemate remained relatively unchanged 
until September 11, 2001.   
5. Current Situation 
After the 9/11 attacks and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, 
federal officials conducted cursory reviews of the chemical industry and subsequently 
found and reported an array of problems. First and foremost, glaring vulnerabilities were 
discovered at many chemical facilities that could easily be exploited by terrorists. Many 
of the inadequately protected sites store some of the nation’s most lethal substances that, 
if released, would endanger the lives of millions of Americans. Second, relatively no 
mandates exist requiring chemical facilities to assess and address their vulnerabilities to 
attacks. Instead, security and protection of most plants are solely determined by their 
personnel with little or no third-party oversight. Compounding this issue, DHS is the lead 
federal agency for the chemical sector, but the department does not have commensurate 
statutory authority. In other words, DHS is unable to require facility owners/operators to 
take any actions. Last, no federal agency comprehensively assessed the vulnerabilities at 
the nation’s chemical facilities against terrorism. Therefore, the extent of preparedness at 
sites is largely unknown. As described above, years of agencies focusing on accidental, 
rather than man-made disasters, likely fueled this problem.   
Despite these well-documented deficiencies, substantial corrective action has yet 
to be undertaken. Even though government reports, congressional testimony and federal 
officials consistently state chemical facilities need to adequately assess and address their 
vulnerabilities to terrorism, most have not. As a result, large numbers of Americans are 
needlessly put in danger, and the federal government does not comprehensively know the 
size of the problem. Based on these shortcomings, it seems apparent a more effective 
approach needs to be developed, implemented and sustained to reduce the attractiveness 
of chemical facilities as targets for terrorists. However, what are the best ways to achieve 
this outcome? How should a new policy be structured? Who are the major stakeholders 
and what are their concerns? What trade-offs are created by a new policy? These are just 
a few of the key questions likely to be generated while evaluating alternative policies and 
are therefore discussed herein.  
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6. Lessons Learned from Disasters 
Two primary lessons can be derived from the Bhopal and Texas City 
catastrophes. First, chemical facility disasters can be extremely lethal and financially 
costly. A major chemical release or explosion may injure or kill thousands, and economic 
losses could run into the billions. Recognizing the severity of these costs is important 
because history has demonstrated both are goals of terrorists. Accordingly, those sites 
that, if attacked, will likely produce both outcomes are attractive targets for terrorists. 
Understanding this relationship should encourage actions on the part of responsible 
parties to better prepare key chemical facilities for attacks.       
Second, the two tragedies mentioned were the result of unintentional actions. This 
distinction is important to note because oftentimes accidents are much less disastrous 
than malicious acts. To illustrate, neither catastrophe involved a worst-case chemical 
release or explosion. In Texas City, the SS Grandcamp’s volatile cargo had been partially 
unloaded and another burning ship was towed out of the port before either exploded. In 
the Union Carbide incident not all of the plant’s deadly chemical vapors escaped. Only 
approximately 41 tons was released, roughly the half the amount that just one typical 
railcar tank holds.45 However, a thinking adversary can choose to strike a facility based 
on time, place, weather, type and amount of substance stored on site and its economic 
impact. All of these factors could easily magnify the consequences of a successful attack.  
It seems reasonable to assume that if terrorists were to strike a chemical facility, 
they would attempt to cause the greatest possible damage by releasing or igniting most, if 
not all, of the deadliest substances on site. In addition, a facility that is in close proximity 
to a densely populated area and one that would have a major affect on the economy 
would be chosen. Therefore, it can reasonably be inferred that a man-made disaster at a 
chemical plant will be much more costly than any accidental catastrophe of the past. This 
understanding should encourage stakeholders to undertake significant and concerted 
efforts to protect against future attacks at chemical facilities. It will not be easy to prevent 
a determined and “smart” adversary. Terrorists can circumvent, overpower and disable 
protective measures. They can also use ruses, find weaknesses, or conduct insider-
                                                 
45 J. P. Grupta, “The Bhopal Gas Tragedy: Could It Have Happened In A Developed Country?,” 
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operations to infiltrate sites. Accordingly, it will take a comprehensive and collaborative 
approach to resolve the complex issue of chemical facility preparedness.   
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III. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine for a moment that thousands of bombs are lying on the ground within the 
United States. Some are clustered together while others are sparsely located. A few 
bombs are adequately protected from terrorists, but the vast majority is not. To make 
matters worse, many of the most lethal bombs are positioned near densely populated 
areas. If just one explodes, tens of thousands of Americans would likely be injured or 
killed. A blast of this magnitude could also have disastrous economic impacts.     
This story may sound unbelievable, but many use it to describe the current 
condition of the U.S. chemical industry. They claim that one only needs to replace the 
words “chemical facilities” for “bombs” in the scenario above to get a clear 
understanding of the extreme risks now facing many Americans. Given these conditions, 
what can the lead federal agency tasked with chemical sector security, DHS, do to 
remedy this nationwide problem?46    
B. CONDITIONS SUPPORTING PARTNERSHIPS 
It has been almost five years since 9/11, and many of the nation’s most critical 
infrastructure vulnerabilities have received some attention. However, according to 
government documents, news reports and other sources, little has been done to reduce the 
attractiveness of chemical facilities as targets of terrorism. Compounding this problem is 
that over 66,000 chemical facilities are spread across the country.47 Within this universe 
the EPA has identified 15,000 as posing extreme dangers to the public. Furthermore, 
according to chemical facilities’ own records, 123 chemical sites are located throughout 
the nation that have toxic “worst-case” scenarios where more than one million people 
could be at risk of exposure to a cloud of toxic gas.48 About 600 facilities could each 
                                                 
46 National Strategy For Homeland Security, 32. 
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Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 2003), 9.  
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potentially threaten between 100,000 and a million people, and another 2,300 sites could 
each potentially affect between 10,000 and 100,000 people.49    
Despite these risks, an effective national approach to chemical facility 
preparedness does not exist. The limited progress that has been made involves a 
patchwork of uncoordinated efforts. Additionally, chemical plants are almost exclusively 
owned and managed by the private sector. As a result, government has little control over 
their operations. Moreover, few mandates require chemical facilities to institute 
safeguards, and incentives to do so are almost nonexistent. A final complicating factor is 
that the Department of Homeland Security is the lead federal agency for chemical sector 
security, but it does not have the statutory authority to require most sites to implement 
measures to prevent, deter, protect against, mitigate from, and/or respond to terrorist 
attacks. Clearly, this lack of power limits what DHS can accomplish. Given these 
conditions, the Department of Homeland Security should consider the following 
proposals.    
C. PARTNERSHIP ALTERNATIVES 
In order to increase the readiness level of the country’s chemical facilities for 
terrorist attacks, DHS needs to “reject past dogmas, to think anew and to act anew.”50 
The problem of chemical facility preparedness is too large for the Department of 
Homeland Security to solve alone. In addition, it involves complex interdependencies 
that necessitate input from various key stakeholders. To overcome these issues, a 
collective public-private approach is needed, but what is the best way to bring both 
sectors together? There are at least three alternative courses of action for consideration.  
As discussed earlier, DHS currently pursues voluntary avenues for forming 
public-private partnerships to improve chemical facility preparedness. In this approach 
DHS relies on a handful of incentives (“carrots”) to encourage all levels of government, 
as well as facility owners/operators to participate in joint readiness efforts. Carrots 
primarily consist of limited DHS-led outreach programs and site visits. In addition, some 
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grants and tax credits are offered. This voluntary approach has been used for several 
years. According to most industry experts, it has not been adequately successful.  
In lieu of this situation, two other alternative courses of action are suggested. One 
alternative forces the establishment of partnerships through the use of laws (“sticks”). In 
all likelihood this tactic would entail the passage of federal mandates giving DHS the 
power to require the public sector and private industry to work together to better prepare 
facilities for attack. This approach was used to establish Local Emergency Planning 
Committees (LEPCs) to focus on emergency planning in communities near chemical 
plants. It is also a component of the proposed Chemical Security Act, discussed later. In 
short, this approach will force government and business to combine efforts to reduce the 
attractiveness of chemical facilities as targets of terrorism.  
A second alternative uses a more balanced approach. It involves DHS employing 
a mixture of both carrots and sticks. DHS will also need to utilize a new type of 
leadership style. To initiate this alternative, legislation is first needed to provide DHS 
with the requisite authority to ensure that chemical facility operators/owners take 
adequate measures to reduce their sites’ attractiveness to attack. In addition, the enacted 
legislation will assert that DHS should join with key partners from government and 
business to work together to achieve the new mandate. DHS will rely on its new 
leadership position to establish collaborative regional public-private partnerships. In 
them, stakeholders will be granted significant roles and responsibilities. Ultimately, 
participants will determine the who, what, when, where and how of improving the 
regions’ level of preparedness at nearby chemical facilities for acts of terrorism. In 
essence, this option will establish a community-governance partnership of readiness 
efforts    
D. INPUTS, OUTPUTS, & OUTCOMES  
Listed below are the inputs (resources), outputs, and desired outcomes for the two 
described alternatives, including how each would be measured according to this author. 
Reviewing this information will help partially determine which alternative course of 
action should be adopted. 
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MANDATED (“STICK”) APPROACH 
INPUTS              ACTIVITIES            OUTPUTS                        OUTCOMES        
Resources          Services                    Products                               Intermediate  
Facilities             Training              Classes taught                    New knowledge/abilities  
Staff                     Education          Audits performed                 Increased skills 
Volunteers          Compliance          Inspections conducted          Fewer enforcement actions 
Funds                 Reporting            Reports submitted                 Reduced violations 
Equipment          Rule-making      Requirements issued              Increased security measures  
Computers     V.A.s conducted                                     End 
Software       Participants trained                                            Vulnerabilities reduced 
Supplies                                                                                 Increased facility preparedness 
          
MIXED (“CARROT & STICK”) APPROACH 
INPUTS                 ACTIVITIES        OUTPUTS                                 OUTCOMES         
Resources             Services                   Products                                    Intermediate  
Facilities     Training                 Classes taught                    New knowledge/skills/abilities 
Staff          Education              Sites visited                       Increased skills/communications 
Volunteers      Outreach             Meetings held                    Changed attitudes/values 
Funds           Mediation             Materials distributed           Increased network awareness 
Equipment           Facilitation          Service hours                      Increased # of participants   
Computers       Help calls                                                 End  
Software                                           Modified behavior 
Supplies                                                       Increased facility preparedness 
    Improved network preparedness  
    Enhanced relationships 
    Increased productivity  
    Reduced costs and less oversight 
    Increased support/involvement   
27 
Measuring the performance of the Mandated Approach would primarily involve 
metrics associated with compliance and are generally quantitatively-based. For example, 
the number, ease, and magnitude of security breaches in a given year compared to the 
previous year. These breaches could be actual lapses or failures that occurred during tests 
(simulations, reviews, role-plays, etc.). Also, third-party audits of preparedness results 
could be conducted with grades being assigned to the different categories such as 
prevention, protection, mitigation, and response. Scores can be compared from year to 
year to track progress. Furthermore, the number of vulnerabilities addressed per period 
can be used as another measure. Finally, pre/post-effort questionnaires can be 
administered to detect changes in KSAs (e.g., knowledge, skills and abilities).    
In addition to the measures described above, determining the performance of the 
Mixed Approach requires a more comprehensive and qualitative evaluation. For example, 
various survey instruments will be distributed to stakeholders eliciting their input 
regarding the achievement of certain outcomes (behavior changes, perception of 
relationships, opinion regarding facility and network preparedness, etc.). Proxies will also 
be analyzed to measure results in nebulous areas. For more definitive outcomes, 
performance indicators can be calculated and reviewed. Continuous benchmarking 
against best practices will be a necessity.  
E. SWOT ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC ISSUE DEVELOPMENT      
In order to identify strategic issues for DHS, a Strength, Weakness, Opportunity 
and Threat (SWOT) analysis is necessary. Conducting this kind of an evaluation helps an 
organization make sense of its internal and external environment.51 A better 
understanding of one’s context sets the stage for effective strategy development since the 
inside can now be productively linked with the outside.52 In general, a SWOT analysis 
helps to paint a picture of the organization as a whole, not a collection of parts, in relation 
to its internal and external environment.  
Based on an assessment of DHS’s internal and external environment, the below 
listed strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats/challenges were identified: 
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STRENGTHS 
• Comprehensive understanding of network interdependencies 
• Strong industry reputation 
• Expertise in assessing and mitigating vulnerabilities 
• Nationally disbursed staff 
• Partnering and collaborating ability 
• Unique modeling tools  
• Holistic view of homeland security 
• Significant resources 
• Access to threat information 
WEAKNESSES 
• Turnover of personnel 
• Repeated departmental restructuring 
• Lack of statutory authority 
• Need to rely on voluntary efforts 
• Lack of consensus regarding problem identification  
• Nebulous metrics 
• Rapidly changing assessment methodologies 
• Information assurance issues 
• Legacy cultures 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Collaboration and partnerships 
• Strong public desire to secure nation’s critical infrastructure  
• Political acceptability for action (Political acceptance of action?) 
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• Increase effectiveness and efficiency through integrated approach  
• Need for local and state government involvement 
• Desire for private-public support 
• Teach (train and educate) stakeholders 
• Build stronger communities 
• Need to develop self-sufficient stakeholder operated programs   
• Become leaders in homeland security efforts 
THREATS/CHALLENGES 
• Decreased agency political and public support 
• Loss of legitimacy 
• Overstretching of resources 
• Political support/focus shifts to new priorities 
• More need than resources 
• Loss of industry lobby support 
• Outperformed by private sector 
• Downturn in economy 
• Lack of understanding of what DHS does 
• Loss of quality personnel 
• Shrinking budget 
After completing a SWOT analysis, the next step in the strategic planning process 
is to focus attention on organizational mandates, mission and values. Accordingly, DHS’s 
mission statement reads, “We will lead the unified national effort to secure America. We 
will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and 
hazards to the Nation. We will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful 
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immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.”53 In addition, DHS 
has three core values. Of particular interest is Respect: Honoring our Partners which 
states, “We will value highly the relationships we build with our customers, partners and 
stakeholders.”54 Equally important when developing strategic issues, DHS must consider 
its product and service level, product mix, clients, users and payers, cost, financing, 
structure, processes and management. Having weighed these factors, DHS seems to be 
facing three critical challenges. Each can build upon or take advantage of DHS’s 
strengths and opportunities while minimizing or overcoming its weaknesses and threats 
identified in the SWOT analysis. Below is a summary of the selected policy challenges, 
framed as questions, as well as a brief description of what made them strategic issues.    
1. What can DHS do to Improve Chemical Facility Preparedness 
Nationwide?   
As already discussed, many believe chemical facility preparedness for acts of 
terrorism is currently inadequate. An attack resulting in a catastrophic release could prove 
deadly for a large number of Americans and have severe economic impacts. 
Complicating matters is the fact that over 66,000 chemical facilities are spread 
throughout the U.S. and nearly all of them are privately owned. Resolving these 
enormous issues without bankrupting the industry that DHS is trying to protect will be no 
small feat.          
2. How does DHS Define a “Unified National Effort”?   
This phrase appears in DHS’s mission statement and it is implicitly referred to in 
the department’s core values. Also, the National Strategy for Homeland Security 
promotes the formation of public-private partnerships for critical infrastructure 
protection.55 In addition, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan echoes the same 
sentiment.56  However, in spite of the lip service paid to this collaborative concept, it has 
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not yet come to fruition in the chemical sector. In its absence, some cities, counties and 
states have taken it upon themselves to implement security measures, but a majority has 
stood idle on the sidelines. Consequently, a patchwork of efforts to protect chemical 
facilities has evolved creating gaps in some areas and “stovepipes” in others. Many say 
that this kind of disjointed approach is what made America vulnerable to the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.  
3.  How can DHS Engage Public-Private Partners in Preparedness 
Efforts?  
As stated above, DHS is the nation’s lead federal agency for the chemical sector. 
The department is specifically tasked with integrating and coordinating federal, state, 
local and private sector critical infrastructure protection efforts. However, DHS was 
never given the requisite authority to carryout its mandate. For example, DHS must 
generally obtain owners’/operators’ permission to enter into their chemical facilities. 
Without consent, DHS officials are unable to gain access. In addition, most sites are not 
required to cooperate with DHS nor comply with its recommendations or requests. While 
some facility managers have heeded DHS’s advice and implemented adequate 
preparedness measures, many have not. As long as this condition exists, a large number 
of American lives will be at risk. Next, properly preparing the chemical industry for acts 
of terrorism is a massive undertaking. Securing the thousands of lethal facilities scattered 
across the country dwarfs DHS’s capabilities. The fact that portions of the chemical 
industry are highly networked complicates matters. Because of this situation, it is 
unlikely that DHS alone can resolve the problem without causing unintended 
consequences elsewhere. Accordingly, a collective public-private effort is needed, but 
what is the best approach that can be used to bring these partners together? 
F.  PROPOSED STRATEGIC IDEA 
Based on the analyses above, it is proposed that DHS lead a movement to forge 
new regional public-private sector partnerships. To bring governments (local, state and 
federal) and businesses together to ensure chemical facility preparedness, DHS can use a 
proper mixture of regionally developed, implemented and sustained mandates and 
incentives. This kind of collaborative arrangement is more likely to produce seamless, 
flexible and effective solutions while promoting creativity, innovation and imagination. 
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In addition, a well-managed partnership and division of labor may create a synergy and a 
co-producer relationship yielding results which neither sector could achieve alone. 
Conducted properly, regional public-private partnerships can better prepare 
chemical facilities for acts of terrorism, thereby protecting Americans and improving 
their quality of life. Similar joint efforts have already proven their effectiveness by 
solving analogous homeland security problems while simultaneously benefiting 
businesses. These kinds of “dual-purpose” benefits are more likely to be produced when 
the two sectors truly work together to create win-win solutions (e.g., increased security 
and improved productivity). For example, in 2002, the Customs Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) initiative was launched with just seven participating 
companies.57 C-TPAT is a cargo partnership where member companies agree to 
implement robust screening and security protections to assure that goods and services are 
not a threat. In exchange, DHS offers expedited processing, streamlined movement of 
products, and a more productive result at the end of the day. So many companies have 
seen the tangible benefits of C-TPAT, both from a security and business standpoint, that 
as of 2005 its membership stood at more than 9,000.58 
Although DHS will lead and facilitate regional public-private efforts, the 
partnerships will intentionally lack a traditional “pyramid” structure. This step is 
bypassed to help create an environment where partners think and behave differently. 
Instead, a disintermediated (e.g., networked) command hierarchy will be put into place. 
In this design, “decision-makers are embedded within a network structure that encourages 
point-to-point movement of data, discussions and decisions.”59 As a result, flexibility, 
speed and decision-making capability are increased.60 However, a disintermediated 
structure requires new kinds of leadership to be exercised. In the absence of a “command 
and control” design, DHS will need to build a vision, a hope for the future that can attract 
legitimacy, credibility, commitment and results. For those who still refuse to participate, 
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DHS can rely on a more conventional approach of incentives (carrots) and/or mandates 
(sticks). However, the later action should only be used as a tool of last resort.  
Another advantage is that establishing cooperative relationships aligns with 
DHS’s current strategy to “coordinate and integrate federal, state, local and private sector 
efforts to protect critical infrastructure,” such as the chemical industry.61  The 
partnerships’ new mission will be to reduce the attractiveness of chemical facilities as 
targets of terrorism while at the same time complement their (private businesses’) 
operations. Both outcomes can be achieved by jointly working towards strengthening 
chemical facilities’ ability to prevent, deter, protect against, mitigate from and respond to 
terrorist attacks. All of these pursuits are also strategic goals of DHS.62  
To initiate this proposal, the Department of Homeland Security should lobby 
Congress for the requisite authority to collaborate with stakeholders so as to ensure that 
chemical facilities reduce their attractiveness as targets of terrorism. Accomplishing this 
task requires DHS to use its expertise, resources, political clout and credibility. The time 
for this move could not be better. The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee just completed a series of hearings entitled Chemical Facility Security: What 
Is The Appropriate Federal Role without taking any action.63 Once the necessary 
legislation is passed, DHS can move on to the next step of identifying the nation’s high-
value sites. This task is easily and quickly accomplished by using current Risk 
Management Plan data that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) already 
possesses. Afterwards, critical chemical facilities’ vulnerable zones can be clustered 
together, based on proximity, to form regions. Next, DHS will identify and invite key 
stakeholders from both the private and public sectors in every identified region to form a 
Regional Defense Unit (RDU). In other words, each region will have its own RDU. Once 
in place, participating members will determine, implement, and oversee specific 
measures to reduce the attractiveness of key chemical facilities as targets of terrorism. In 
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short, stakeholders will be deeply engaged in self-governance of preparedness efforts. To 
keep the entire process transparent and to improve accountability, RDU members will 
provide periodic reports and testimony to local, state and federal governing 
boards/committees reducing the likelihood that RDUs become co-opted.                     
G. BENCHMARKING 
A major reason behind the strategic goal of forming regional public-private 
partnerships is to improve the preparedness of chemical facilities against acts of terrorism 
and thereby strengthen homeland security for the entire nation. Accordingly, it seems 
appropriate to benchmark the preparedness levels of public-private partnerships to assess 
if the goal is being achieved. But how can this goal effectively be accomplished?  
Measuring preparedness often proves to be a difficult task. The process can be 
nebulous, tending to be more of an art than a science. To help ease and improve this 
effort, various organizations have already produced widely accepted standards that can be 
used to benchmark partnerships’ progress towards preparedness. One such example is 
NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity 
Programs. NFPA stands for National Fire Protection Association, which is an 
international nonprofit codes and standards organization. NFPA’s title can be a bit 
misleading. It is made up of over 60,000 members from all over the world, and less than a 
quarter are affiliated with fire departments.64 The majority of members are 
representatives from the private and public sectors, and they come from various 
disciplines.  
The NFPA 1600 standard is considered by many to be an excellent benchmark for 
continuity and emergency planners in both public and private sectors.65 The standard 
addresses methodologies for defining and identifying risks and vulnerabilities and 
provides planning guidelines. NFPA 1600 truly takes a total program approach. It has 
been adopted as an organizational preparedness standard by FEMA and the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI). Moreover, the 9/11 Commission recommended in 
its final report that NFPA 1600 be recognized as THE national preparedness standard.66  
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NFPA 1600 lists and defines 13 key preparedness components: (1) laws and 
authorities, (2) hazard identification, risk assessment, and impact analysis, (3) hazard 
mitigation, (4) resource management, (5) mutual aid, (6) planning, (7) 
direction/control/coordination, (8) communications and warning, (9) operations and 
procedures, (10) logistics, facilities and training, (11) exercises, evaluations, and 
corrective actions, (12) crisis communications and public information, (13) finance and 
administration.67 These preparedness components apply to both the public and private 
sectors. Accordingly, each of these 13 components can be used to evaluate the progress 
of readiness efforts for the proposed regional public-private partnerships. For example, 
“hazard mitigation” (#3) involves the reduction of Risk which is a function of 
Vulnerabilities X Consequences. Lowering either of these two factors results in decreased 
risk and improved readiness.  
Using the above relationship (e.g., Risk = Vulnerabilities x Consequences) as a 
guide, Step 1 in a proposed evaluation process is to select and direct a composite team of 
stakeholders (e.g. first responders, facility personnel, DHS, etc.) to identify the total 
number of chemical facilities within a region. Sites are then grouped (low, medium, and 
high) and ranked (highest to lowest) based on their likely consequences (lethality, 
economic, symbolic, etc.). Tracking this data will provide the baseline information 
needed for subsequent metrics and actions. In Step 2, the team will conduct vulnerability 
assessments (VAs) for all sites in order of their priority (group and rank). A VA identifies 
weaknesses in a facility’s operation that can be exploited to allow a disaster to occur. The 
percentage of facilities that have completed these analyses will be tracked (Step 2 divided 
by Step 1). This information will help determine the process of identifying where the 
most need exists for preparedness programs. Once Step 2 is completed, a new grouping 
and ranking will be performed based on risk, since consequences and vulnerabilities are 
now known. In addition, the total number of vulnerabilities for all sites will be summed 
up. Step 3 involves the team focusing on reducing identified vulnerabilities. As this is 
being accomplished, progress will be tracked by dividing the number of vulnerabilities 
addressed by the total derived in Step 2. In Step 4, the team will turn its attention to 
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lowering the potential consequences initially determined in Step 1. This improvement 
could be accomplished in a variety of ways (implementing warning systems, mitigation 
equipment, training, etc.). While this action is being taken, hazard mitigation progress 
can be tracked by comparing initial consequences identified in Step 1 to reduced 
consequences yielded in Step 4. In Step 5, the team will regroup and re-rank chemical 
facilities that have been the subject of the hazard mitigation efforts. This process is 
necessary because facilities’ vulnerabilities and/or potential consequences have been 
decreased. Reduction progress can be gauged by calculating the percentage of facilities 
that were “downgraded” (e.g. moved from a higher to a lower risk group). Another way 
to evaluate partnership efforts is to divide a facility’s mitigated risk by its initial risk.       
These examples are but a few of the performance indicators that can be used to 
benchmark hazard mitigation efforts. The same could be accomplished for the other 12 
preparedness components of NFPA 1600. Most of the raw data for performance indicator 
calculations will come from various works conducted by stakeholder teams. However, 
separate accountability committees from within the public-private partnerships will 
actually perform the calculations and track the teams’ progress. These committees will 
need to instill transparency and credibility in their benchmarking processes. They can 
achieve this goal by making their efforts publicly available, providing findings in open 
hearings/meetings and having third-party audits of results.         
H. IMPLEMENTATION 
The proposed strategic idea of forming regional public-private partnerships to 
focus on chemical facility protection represents a significant departure from the status 
quo. As discussed earlier, plant owners/operators alone currently determine what 
safeguards their sites enact. Selection is usually based on a facility’s individual situation 
and need. Clearly, the strategic idea radically changes this narrow view of preparedness 
and isolated decision-making process. If adopted, command and control of preparedness 
related issues at chemical facilities will now be more participatory, involve additional 
stakeholders and take on a region-wide perspective.   
When entities, both public and private, attempt to translate change of this 
magnitude into action they often encounter four key organizational hurdles: 
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• Cognitive – waking employees (partners) up to the need for a 
strategic shift;  
• Resources – convincing employees (partners) that major change 
does not require additional resources;  
• Motivation – encouraging employees (partners) to voluntarily 
embrace and execute the strategic shift; and 
• Political – tackling opposition from powerful vested interests.68 
These obstacles represent significant challenges for DHS. Overcoming them will 
be critical. This situation is made even more difficult by the presence of two common 
constraints. There is usually great pressure to effectuate the strategic shift quickly and at 
low costs. Therefore, given both of these conditions and faced with the four 
organizational hurdles, how can DHS effectively implement regional public-private 
partnerships?  
A potential solution to the challenges described above is for DHS to use tipping 
point leadership. This leadership approach rests on the premise that all organizations 
have people, acts and activities that exercise disproportionate influence on 
performance.69 As a result, change-agents should direct their efforts at transforming these 
“extremes.” If done properly, a tipping point eventually will be reached where 
widespread toppling of the four key organizational hurdles happens at an accelerating 
pace until the masses are changed. As this process occurs, the strategic idea moves from 
thought to action and ultimately to institutionalization. Accordingly, the key to expedient 
and inexpensive strategic implementation is to identify and leverage disproportionate 
influence forces.70 Herein lies the challenge for the Department of Homeland Security. In 
other words, what are the extremes (people, acts and activities) and how can they be used 
to overcome the four key organizational hurdles? 
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To answer this question, it may be helpful for DHS to first understand how each 
obstacle will likely impact the implementation of regional public-private partnerships. 
Some barriers may have more or less influence on the adoption of the strategic idea than 
others and therefore require extra or little attention. In addition, some may be closer or 
further from their tipping points and as a result need little or extra effort from DHS.  
Invariably, initiating major changes will encounter political roadblocks. 
Generally, overcoming them is difficult. Fortunately for DHS, the political winds seem to 
be blowing in its favor. As mentioned earlier, the Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs just completed four hearings entitled “Chemical 
Facility Security: What Is the Appropriate Federal Role?”. According to transcripts 
committee members share a consensus that federal legislation is needed to shore up 
safeguards at dangerous sites. In fact, several competing bills are now being considered. 
Most prescribe a laundry list of security measures for chemical facilities to abide by, as 
well as various punishments for those who refuse to comply.   
Political support also comes from the chemical sector’s largest and most powerful 
trade association, the American Chemical Council (ACC). The ACC has repeatedly asked 
for industry regulation to strengthen the protection of facilities.71 This group is not alone 
in its call for government intervention. Several other trade, environmental and 
professional organizations are currently seeking political action to improve chemical 
facility security. Moreover, the Secretary of DHS believes legislation is necessary to 
address the problem. In addition, Secretary Chertoff has repeatedly stated that 
FLEXIBILITY is the key to any effective and long-term federal proposal.72 Flexibility is 
exactly what the strategic idea provides. While it is likely that the proposal will include 
some national minimum security standards and common procedures, regional 
partnerships will have substantial flexibility to tailor operations to their specific needs.  
Since the political landscape is already close to a tipping point, it seems intuitive 
that Secretary Chertoff should seize the opportunity and promote the strategic idea as a 
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potential solution for improving chemical facility preparedness. As discussed above, the 
proposal provides the necessary flexibility that DHS seeks. It is also likely to yield more 
effective long-term protection results for sites than that which static federal mandates can 
achieve. Furthermore, facility owners/operators will probably embrace the regional 
public-private partnership approach, as compared to strict federal regulations, since they 
will be significantly involved in the proposal’s development and execution. In essence, 
the strategic idea can create a “win-win” situation for the private and public sectors.   
The next challenge for DHS is overcoming the resource hurdle. The chemical 
industry encompasses nearly 66,000 facilities scattered across the country. At first glance, 
securing all of them seems like an insurmountable task. However, many experts agree 
that only a small percentage of this universe presents enough of a danger to warrant 
regulation. In fact, most of the current legislative proposals now up for consideration in 
Congress concentrate protection efforts on approximately 5%-20% of sites. Safeguarding 
between 3,000-15,000 sites will obviously necessitate fewer resources than what is 
needed to protect all 66,000.  
In addition, since portions of the chemical sector are highly interconnected, the 
resource obstacle can further be minimized by focusing on protecting the most critical 
nodes (e.g., hubs). This is a point in a network which represents where an attack would 
cause the greatest damage. If a network’s hubs are sufficiently defended, then the entire 
network is protected with the least cost.73 This approach reduces the problem of size and 
complexity to a more manageable task of selective investment.74 As a result, fewer 
resources are required.   
Other resource reductions will be produced by the strategic idea since much of the 
work for carrying it out is “outsourced” to regional partners. DHS will simply be in 
charge of initiating, overseeing and facilitating the proposal. Obviously, in the long-term 
this strategy requires much less effort than if the Department of Homeland Security alone 
actually had to perform all the necessary functions.       
                                                 
73 Dr. Ted Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 21.  
74 Ibid.  
40 
Further resource reductions can be achieved by multiplying the value of current 
assets. This represents one of the powerful benefits of the strategic idea.75 Its region-wide 
approach to chemical facility protection encourages the pooling of assets and efforts 
through partnerships. For example, facility owners/operators currently implement 
security measures according to their own individual needs. Little thought is given as to 
the environment outside one’s fenced borders. Generally, this kind of micro perspective 
and isolated decision-making leads to wasted resources. To illustrate, many facilities now 
have their own security force. However, due to economies of scale, it is likely that fewer 
personnel would be needed if security functions were shared among sites within a 
geographical region. Also, each facility would not need its own security center. 
Technology costs would be reduced since fewer items are needed. Equipment such as 
radios, cameras and recording equipment would be interoperable instead of being 
incompatible. Region-wide joint training and common operating procedures could yield 
additional efficiencies. 
Breaking through the cognitive barrier primarily entails having facility managers 
realize their current security efforts are insufficient to protect them against terrorism. 
Currently, most of them have the opinion that reasonable safeguards are already in place 
and that additional steps are not needed. Facility owners/operators apparently feel they 
have a grasp of the threat against them as well as an accurate understanding of their own 
vulnerabilities. Based on these perceptions, plant officials believe they have implemented 
adequate security measures to have driven risk down to an acceptable level. Accordingly, 
to overcome these cognitive hurdles, plant officials must acknowledge that gaps exist in 
their summations. One way this can be accomplished is to have facility owners/operators 
come face-to-face with poor performance.76 For example, they can conduct surprise tours 
of each others’ plants to see weaknesses first hand. Recently, several similar site visits 
were conducted by undercover news investigators and their findings shocked both the 
public and politicians. Plant owners/operators responded by saying the reports were only 
representative of a small percentage of the industry and more of an anomaly than the 
norm. Actually seeing the problems firsthand may change their perceptions. Another way 
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to cause the necessary paradigm shift is to have plant officials accompany “red-teams” 
who test sites’ security. In the past, these exercises have discovered major soft spots in 
protective measures and served as the impetus for changes in their operations. Combined, 
the results of these two efforts could persuade owner/operators that additional chemical 
facility preparedness efforts are needed.           
After overcoming the political, resource and cognitive hurdles, the stage will be 
set to maneuver around motivational obstacles. Facility owners/operators exert the 
primary resistance to improvements in chemical facility security. Their opposition is 
based on three key arguments. First, most managers believe additional protective 
measures will cost them too much. However, by taking a regional approach and pooling 
resources, security cost concerns can be greatly reduced. Second, a majority of plant 
officials simply say they are not required nor encouraged to upgrade their sites’ current 
security. No laws or incentives exist to drive additional changes but both are created with 
the implementation of the strategic idea. Third, many facility owners/operators feel they 
have already put into place reasonable safeguards. They claim that extra measures are not 
necessary and will result in wasted resources if implemented. However, as discussed 
above, the proposal will likely cause this viewpoint to shift in favor of new efforts. By 
immersing plant managers in the process of developing and carrying out the strategic 
idea, they should come to understand that individual security efforts are inadequate to 
deal with the challenge of terrorism. Plant officials will also learn that a regional public-
private partnership approach is much more effective than current efforts.                
Motivation can be further enhanced by promoting the regional aspect of the 
strategic idea. It tackles the problem of chemical facility “insecurity” incrementally, one 
region (e.g., “atom”) at a time, plant by plant. Using this approach, the challenge appears 
much more attainable and actionable. Accordingly, motivation should be high and 
eventually lead to a strategic shift in the perceptions of stakeholders. A second way to 
jumpstart motivation is to focus on key influencers (e.g., kingpins) within a region. 
Motivation can be achieved by empowering and elevating kingpins to execute the 
strategic idea. Performed properly, this step can trigger a movement of the masses. One 
way the proposal accomplishes this outcome is that it uses key influencers within a 
geographical area to meaningfully participate in partnership efforts. They are assigned 
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significant roles and responsibilities. With key influencers having position and power, 
conditions are ripe for motivation to spread throughout the organization. Last, motivation 
can be instilled by increasing the transparency of actions. This visibility represents one of 
the strong points of the strategic idea. It calls for kingpins to provide public reports and 
open testimony, and to hold meetings in which citizens can actively participate. This 
process also ensures key influencers are held publicly accountable. 
I. PILOT INITIATIVE 
The strategic idea represents a significant departure from the status quo. 
Therefore, its implementation will likely cause DHS to face major technical difficulties. 
As such, a pilot project should first be initiated as part of a staged implementation 
process. By doing so, DHS will be able to determine or prove the cause and effect 
relations between particular solutions and desired effects.77 This step allows DHS to 
decide what proposed techniques do and do not work so that modifications can be made 
before going nationwide with the strategic idea. Also, staging implementation involves 
organizing a series of small wins on the way to full-scale implementation of the 
proposal.78    
A pilot initiative to test the proposal will involve the following steps:79 
• Determining the validity of proposed changes utilizing quasi-experimental 
designs. For example, pre-post design tests can be applied to regions 
where the proposal is piloted. By conducting analyses (using surveys, 
observations, interviews, reasoning, etc.) causal inferences can be made.  
• Performing tests in a quasi-controlled environment. For example, non-
equivalent groups design (NEGD) can be used. This test involves selecting 
two regions, or groups of regions, that are as similar as possible so fair 
comparisons can be made between the treated one (e.g., where the 
proposal is pilot tested) and the controlled one.  
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• Testing several possible proposal variations, and searching for their 
different strengths and weaknesses. This process simply involves applying 
altered versions of the strategic idea in different regions. Afterwards, 
outcomes are measured and deductions are made as to what form of the 
proposal caused the most effective results.    
• Using experimental specialists to evaluate “cause and effect” 
relationships. Here, experts are brought into the experimental region 
during the early stages of proposal implementation to ensure evaluation 
experiments are valid and reliable. In addition, these professionals will 
improve the credibility and objectivity of test results.     
• Designing tests to measure effectiveness of proposed changes, not their 
efficiency. One way this goal can be achieved is to use red-teams in both 
experimental and controlled regions. The purpose of red-teams is to 
surreptitiously penetrate a facility’s security. The results of their attempts 
are then used to evaluate the effectiveness the proposal.  
J. SUMMARY OF JOINT PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS  
To better safeguard Americans from suffering a Bhopal-like catastrophe, it is 
imperative that a new approach to public-private partnering be designed, implemented 
and sustained. Current voluntary efforts have not yet produced adequate results. In 
addition, based on various environmental conditions, relying on strict mandates is not 
likely to be DHS’s optimum long-term alternative. According to the above analyses, the 
option which uses a mixture of mandates and incentives should result in the most 
effective outcome. In addition to its utility, the Department of Homeland Security’s 
adoption of a balanced approach will exemplify its commitment to the belief that 
homeland security is a shared responsibility. The proposal also illustrates that the DHS 
truly values its homeland security partners.   
Determining how the public and private sectors should join forces to improve 
chemical facility preparedness is just one piece of the puzzle.  It is also important to fully 
understand what tools the new partnerships can use to reduce the attractiveness of sites as 
targets of terrorism. For the most part, these instruments fall into two broad categories—
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mandates and incentives. Deciding the proper mix of each will be critical to the outcome 
of the strategic idea. Just as important is how these tools are ultimately developed, 
implemented and sustained by regional partnerships. This process will be key to the long-
term success of the proposed effort.        
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IV. COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT ANALYSIS  
A. A MIXED BAG OF APPROACHES 
As it stands now, chemical facility security efforts include a mixture of local, state 
and federal laws.80 Not surprisingly, this composite of approaches yields varying 
outcomes. Reviewing each of these methods and comparing their strengths and 
weaknesses may provide insights for how to proceed to ensure the preparedness of the 
nation’s chemical facilities for acts of terrorism. Also, mandates have been used in other 
sectors (water and power/energy) to address similar critical infrastructure protection 
concerns. Solutions to these analogous problems may be applicable to chemical sites. 
Furthermore, several chemical facility security bills are now being considered for 
passage. The front-runner is the Chemical Securities Act (CSA). It includes a variety of 
mandates that, if passed, plants will have to comply with. Assessing the likely advantages 
and disadvantages of the CSA could provide additional direction for preparedness efforts.    
B. CURRENT MANDATES 
Some believe that current voluntary efforts alone are not sufficient to adequately 
protect the nation’s chemical facilities from terrorism.81 This group is largely comprised 
of environmental organizations, activists, emergency responders and many in 
government. This camp proposes relying heavily on mandates to force plant 
owners/operators to adhere to specific measures. Most of these tasks focus on fortifying 
sites. In accordance with this position, some mandates have been enacted on a limited 
basis by local, state and federal officials to better prepare chemical facilities for acts of 
terrorism.  
1. Local 
A handful of local jurisdictions have taken aggressive actions to improve nearby 
chemical facility security. This approach involves enacting ordinances mandating 
chemical facility managers to improve their preparedness for attacks. For example, in 
2002, officials in Contra Costa County, California, instituted a requirement forcing 
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operators of chemical facilities within its borders to consider incorporating inherently 
safer technologies into their operations.82 These safeguards could include the use of less 
lethal or volatile chemicals and altering refinery processes to make them less dangerous.  
In 2005, the City of Baltimore, Maryland, passed a landmark ordinance, believed 
to be the first of its kind in the nation. It requires chemical manufacturers to follow a set 
of safety and security regulations devised by local fire and police commissioners.83 
Penalties such as withholding or suspension of facility operating permits can be assessed 
for non-compliance.84 This ordinance was developed with the cooperation and support of 
the Maryland Chemistry and Industrial Technology Alliance (MIDCITA), which is the 
state equivalent to the American Chemistry Council.  
Both of these local statutes had very positive outcomes. They did require nearby 
chemical facilities to implement specific protective measures. The ordinances also 
established a permanent procedure whereby companies and security partners could share 
sensitive information with confidentiality. However, more important than any result are 
the actual processes. The Contra Costa case represents the first time that a local 
government pursued statutory action to mandate certain safety and security requirements 
for chemical facilities. In Baltimore, the city council took the new step one further. It 
used a collaborative public-private sector partnership to focus on plant protection. Local 
officials and MIDCITA joined forces to develop preparedness requirements that were in 
the best interests of all parties. This effort was the first time that a truly participatory 
approach was taken by government and the private sector to reduce the attractiveness of 
chemical facilities as targets for terrorists. Ultimately this strategy demonstrates what is 
possible when business and government work together in good faith toward a common 
goal. Many observers hail these ordinances as a model for what other local agencies 
should do to protect citizens and improve chemical facility preparedness within their 
communities without negatively impacting the industry.  
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In spite of the successes of the ordinances, they do have one significant downside. 
The new mandates only apply to those sites located within the boundaries of the local 
governing bodies that passed them. Facilities just outside the jurisdiction are not 
impacted. This shortcoming is a major weakness of the local approach because if a 
facility experiences a catastrophic chemical release, its consequences could extend over 
several miles. Deadly airborne agents will not simply stop at city-limit signs. 
Neighboring towns and counties are going to be affected. Other levels of government 
recognized this drawback and pursued alternative courses of action.                   
2. State 
A third approach used by two states was to pass laws to strengthen security efforts 
at chemical facilities within their borders. Maryland was the first to enact statewide 
chemical security legislation in the U.S. by passing the Hazardous Material Security Act 
(HMSA). It requires prioritization of facilities, the development and implementation of 
security measures commensurate with risks, training, drills and guidance, 
communications with employees, communities and government agencies, internal audits 
and third party verification. The Maryland law is also consistent with Baltimore’s local 
ordinance regarding chemical security passed just one year earlier. Facilities covered by 
the HMSA must report to the Maryland Department of the Environment and the 
Maryland State Police.85   
In addition, New York officials passed the Anti-Terrorism Preparedness Act of 
2004.86 It mandates that New York’s Office of Homeland Security review the 
vulnerability of chemical facilities and suggest necessary improvements. The same office 
must identify which chemical plants are covered by the new law, but it exempts facilities 
holding fuel for sale and facilities that are water suppliers because they are already 
governed by another office.  
The benefits of the state approach are similar to those achieved by the local 
method. Basically, chemical facilities owners/operators are forced to institute prescribed 
security measures, but on a statewide scale. As a result, plants became more fortified. 
However, there are disadvantages. First, as in the local approach, the mandated laws only 
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apply to facilities located within Maryland and New York. Plants in neighboring states 
are unaffected. Consequently, a toxic release at a site in an adjacent state can still threaten 
the lives of those in New York or Maryland. For this approach to be truly effective, all 
other states will need to enact similar chemical facility preparedness legislation. But in 
states where there is not sufficient support for these kinds of laws, passage is unlikely. A 
second problem exists with the way in which the statewide mandates were crafted. Their 
development involved little input from industry officials. This process was not nearly as 
participatory as the local approach in which collaborative efforts were the norm. 
Consequently, the chemical security laws passed by the states are more rigid than their 
local ordinance counterparts and there is less buy-in from the private sector. Combined, 
these two factors have a tendency to reduce voluntary compliance.                 
3. Federal 
The last approach to review involves federal efforts designed to improve facility 
protection at certain high-risk sites. Examining the effectiveness of these “other” cases 
may provide specific lessons-learned for how to better protect the country’s chemical 
facilities.  
In 2002, Congress passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA). 
Under the act, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) must conduct risk assessments of all vessels 
and facilities on or near the water; develop national and area maritime transportation 
security plans; and approve port, facility and vessel security plans.87 Afterwards, Coast 
Guard personnel must forward these plans to the Environmental Protection Agency.  The 
USCG must also visit MTSA sites at least annually to ensure continued compliance. The 
effect of this effort has been to establish a baseline level of security at 238 chemical 
facilities located within ports.  
Some in Congress believe the MTSA is THE model approach that federal 
policymakers should apply to all hazardous chemical facilities, not just those near the 
water.88 The MTSA has forced high-risk facilities located within shipping corridors to 
implement measures (fencing, lighting, video cameras, 24-hour monitoring, etc.) to 
improve security. But, there are limitations to trying to apply the MTSA to all RMP 
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facilities. As mentioned, the act only affects 238 plants, a relatively small number 
compared to the 15,000 RMP sites spread throughout the country. This larger universe 
makes enforcement much more difficult. Who ensures each site’s initial compliance and 
conducts all of the annually required follow-up inspections? How would this task be 
accomplished since most chemical plants are not located together in shipping ports? 
C. ANALOGOUS PROBLEMS  
Nuclear power plants have long been recognized as potential targets for acts of 
terrorism.89 A catastrophic release at any one of these facilities may lead to the dispersal 
of radioactive materials over several square miles. Depending upon the dosage level, 
human exposure could result in short-term illness and death, as well as long-term deaths 
by cancer and other diseases. Because of these risks, nuclear power plants are subject to 
strict regulation and legislation regarding site preparedness. However, after the 9/11 
attacks, protection of these facilities became even more of a concern. As a result, 
additional measures were implemented to further prepare nuclear power plants against 
acts of terrorism. Reviewing and evaluating these instituted security steps may provide 
clues as to how to better safeguard chemical facilities, since the two sites have common 
characteristics. For example, both serve vital economic functions, are usually located near 
population centers and maintain large inventories of toxic materials. Accordingly, an 
attack at either a nuclear or chemical facility could have devastating financial and human 
costs.  
1. Nuclear Facilities 
All commercial nuclear power plants licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) must be protected by a series of physical barriers and a trained 
security force. Each facility is broken down into three zones: an “owner controlled” 
buffer region, a “protected area,” and a “vital area.”90 The buffer region has the fewest 
physical barriers and access requirements followed by a more restrictive protected area. 
The vital area is the most heavily defended and critical zone. The mandated security force 
must abide by NRC requirements on pre-hiring background investigations and training.  
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Nuclear power plants are also required by the NRC to conduct periodic exercises 
to test its ability to defend against the “design basis threat” (DBT). The DBT is supposed 
to “represent the largest reasonable threat against which a regulated private guard force 
should be expected to defend under existing law.”91 During these “force on force” tests 
an opposing team from outside the plant attempts to penetrate its vital area and damage or 
destroy critical safety systems. It is up to the facility’s security force to repel the 
adversaries. These exercises are NRC-monitored and must be performed every three 
years. The exact details of the DBT are not released to the public for security reasons. 
Nuclear power plants must also have emergency plans in place. In addition, the 
NRC mandates that within an approximately 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) 
around each plant, the operator must maintain warning sirens and regularly conduct 
evacuation exercises monitored by the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency.92 Furthermore, in some states, those living within the EPZ can obtain free non-
radioactive iodine pills. These pills prevent the absorption of radioactive iodine in the 
thyroid which would be a significant component of a release from a nuclear power plant. 
However, the pills offer no protection against other affects of radiation exposure.  
Preparedness mandates for nuclear power plants have had several benefits. First, 
the required physical barriers, access restrictions and layered defenses have made plants 
“hardened” and therefore much more difficult to attack. In addition, since each location is 
protected by an average security force of 75 members, protection is further improved.93 
Sites in various other sectors do not implement comparable security measures. However, 
licensees are required to have only a minimum of five security personnel on-duty at any 
one time, which some say is too low.  Another disadvantage is that security forces from 
other power plants are used to make up the adversarial team for the periodically required 
force-on-force exercises. This practice often pits guards against each other who are from 
the same security company. To many, this situation is seen as a conflict of interest. Not  
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surprisingly, allegations of falsifying exercise results have arisen. To address this issue, it 
has been suggested that a federal force be created within the NRC to replace the private 
guards at nuclear power plants.   
Furthermore, in some states security personnel at nuclear power plants are not 
allowed to be armed. Obviously, this restriction greatly limits the level of defense guards 
are able wage against a determined adversary. For example, the five required on-duty 
personnel could all be theoretically neutralized by one terrorist with a firearm. Some have 
suggested that this state prohibition should be preempted by federal legislation. Also, 
while background investigations are conducted on security guards, similar history checks 
are not conducted on all nuclear facility employees, as well as those who import and 
export nuclear materials at sites. Critics believe that this practice represents a weak link 
in the chain of security which leaves plants vulnerable. They propose that guards, key 
employees and hazardous material transporters be investigated. A final problem is cost. It 
is very expensive to maintain the extensive list of mandatory safeguards.   
2. Public Health Security & Bioterrorism Preparedness & Response Act 
Another relevant federally enacted law is the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act (PHSBPRA). It amends the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (SDWA). The act requires water system facilities (e.g. purification plants) 
serving more than 3,300 people to conduct vulnerability assessments and to develop 
emergency response plans.94 Some federal financial assistance is provided to affected 
facilities to help them comply with the new requirements. It is important to note that the 
amendment did not mandate water systems to mitigate their vulnerabilities.  
This act focused on water systems for several reasons. First, government officials 
were concerned about terrorists contaminating water systems. Second, these facilities 
store large amounts of chlorine and are frequently located in or near densely populated 
residential areas. Chlorine is extremely toxic and, if released in significant quantities, it 
can travel airborne for several miles before dissipating to a non-lethal level. Due to this 
danger, some facilities near critical locations have voluntarily substituted less lethal 
substances for chlorine in their operations. For example, a water purification site within 
                                                 
94 Shea, “Legislative Approaches,” 5. 
52 
four miles of the U.S. Capitol now uses bleach in its process instead of chlorine. Bleach 
is not near as fatal as chlorine, and it dissipates much quicker if airborne. These actions 
combine to greatly reduce the attractiveness of water purification sites as targets of 
terrorism.   
D. PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
Since 9/11, various legislative acts focusing on improving chemical facility 
preparedness nationwide have been crafted and debated on Capitol Hill. One of the most 
popular plans is the Chemical Security Act (CSA), authored by Governor Jon S. Corzine 
of New Jersey.    
Broadly speaking, the CSA mandates that the Environmental Protection Agency 
and the Department of Homeland Security work together to strengthen site preparedness. 
They are required to develop minimum requirements for the improvement of security and 
the reduction of potential hazards at chemical plants and other industrial facilities storing 
large quantities of hazardous materials.95 Representatives from the EPA and DHS, as 
well as state and local agencies are to begin their work by first identifying “high priority” 
chemical sites within one year of the bill’s enactment. To accomplish this task, the EPA 
and DHS must start with the 15,000 RMP facilities. By applying criteria like proximity to 
population centers and other critical infrastructure, the universe of RMP facilities will 
narrow to eventually produce a list of high priority sites. These identified facilities will be 
the only ones subject to the act’s requirements. This process is meant to weed out sites 
located in remote areas, including the vast majority of the agricultural facilities currently 
subject to the EPA’s RMP requirements. 
Next, the CSA requires the EPA, DHS, and state and local agencies to develop 
regulations to require high-risk chemical facilities to: 
• Conduct vulnerability/hazard assessments and 
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• Develop prevention, preparedness and response plans that incorporate the 
assessment results, and include actions to reduce vulnerabilities by 
improving security and using safer technologies.96  
High priority facilities must perform the first step within one year of the 
promulgations of regulations, and the second step must be completed six months later. 
Afterwards, the EPA and DHS will evaluate the assessments and response plans for 
compliance. If either is inadequate, the EPA must provide notice and offer compliance 
assistance. If sufficient corrective measures are not eventually instituted by facility 
personnel, the EPA can issue compliance orders which are subject to notice and hearing 
requirements.97     
The Chemical Security Act encourages continued voluntary industry security 
measures through an “early compliance” provision. It allows high priority facilities to 
submit assessments and response plans for review any time after the bill becomes law. 
Assessments and plans received prior to the publication of draft regulations will be 
evaluated based only on the specific wording of the legislation, and will not be subject to 
the requirements later established in regulations.98 This provision is intended to ensure 
current voluntary preparedness efforts are not inhibited.     
The CSA exempts the information contained in the submitted assessments and 
response plans from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in order to 
protect it from those who would use it to do harm. The bill does require that certifications 
of regulation compliance be made publicly available. In this way, citizens will know what 
facilities are abiding by the CSA while vulnerable information is not unnecessarily 
exposed.  
The Chemical Security Act represents a comprehensive approach to resolving 
chemical facility vulnerabilities. Basically, the bill requires all high priority sites to 
identify their chemical hazards, take actions to reduce the possibility of releases, and 
minimize the consequences of any releases that do occur. These steps would fill in part of                                                  
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a large void that currently exists in the nation’s chemical safety law. The bill proposes 
constructive steps toward a national prevention and chemical security program, and gives 
government additional tools to protect communities in the new era of terrorism.99  The 
CSA also creates a prevention hierarchy for accidental and intentional releases—from 
prevention as a first resort, to add-on controls, security and buffer zones. Doing so puts 
prevention as the top priority. This approach addresses the fundamental difference 
between preventing a chemical facility disaster and trying to control it.100  
Unfortunately, the CSA does not require periodic follow-up inspections of 
security measures after their initial approval like the MTSA does. This drawback 
prevents reasonable assurances that instituted measures are working properly and security 
procedures are being appropriately practiced. Another disadvantage is that the bill is not 
very inclusive of the private sector. While local, state and federal officials are involved, 
there is little mention or use of the private sector. This group possesses a wealth of 
industry knowledge that could be of value. Private sector’s buy-in is generally critical for 
effectiveness, but it will likely be low without sufficient input. Furthermore, the CSA 
does not address the issue of “insider” threats. For example, how rigorous should 
background investigations be for employees and contractors? An effective security plan 
is only as good as its weakest link. Finally, the CSA will only apply to high priority sites. 
That means thousands of chemical facilities will be left unregulated by DHS. Therefore, 
it will be business as usual for the bulk of RMP sites.                
E. SUMMARY OF APPROACHES 
There are those (environmental organizations, activists, emergency responders 
and many in government) who promote relying heavily on federal mandates to force 
plant officials to abide by a laundry list of tasks. Most efforts revolve around fortifying 
sites. Proponents state that this kind of regulation is needed because of the lax security 
that continues at most chemical facilities, which plant managers refuse to properly 
address. A history of news reports, undercover investigations and cursory government 
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inspections at several key facilities where security was found to be lacking seem to 
substantiate their claims.101 This camp argues that without mandates, any added 
protective measures by the industry will only be “window dressing,” and not likely 
effective. As a model for what stringent requirements can yield, these proponents point to 
the high level of security at the nation’s nuclear facilities, which they consider 
safeguarded. They believe the same can be accomplished for the chemical industry.  
Relying heavily on government mandates to remedy existing vulnerabilities is 
unlikely to be as useful a strategy for the chemical sector as it was for the nuclear power 
industry. Mandates are generally more effective when coupled with adequate oversight 
and/or a high level of voluntary compliance. Oversight is obviously easier for the 
country’s 65 or so nuclear plants; however, it would be much more difficult for the 
nation’s 66,000 chemical facilities.102 Also, mandating site preparedness measures has 
been a mainstay of the nuclear industry since its inception. As a result, an expectation and 
acceptance of oversight is ingrained into the organizational culture of the nuclear 
industry. Furthermore, the near disaster at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania has served 
to raise an already heightened perception of the danger associated with nuclear plants. 
Therefore, compliance with federal mandates for nuclear sites is relatively high. 
However, a major chemical facility catastrophe has not happened on U.S. soil in nearly 
60 years. Last, the chemical industry has operated with practically no stipulations 
regarding how facilities should be secured. Both facts make relying solely on government 
mandates to safeguard sites difficult at best. Something more is needed given the size, 
scope and history of the problem.   
The principle benefit of a mandated approach is that established security 
standards provide a minimum guarantee regarding preparedness, assuming they are 
enforced.103 But, there are downsides to using “sticks” to get results. First, minimum 
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standards may be set at an inappropriate level.104 They could be too high for some sites 
and too low for others. Second, government requirements often prove to be an 
unnecessarily expensive and inefficient way to achieve a given degree of protection.105 
Significant resources are often needed to ensure compliance. For example, inspections, 
audits and other bureaucratic “red tape” activities are usually necessary to enforce 
government requirements. Third, mandates do not generally provide incentives for 
innovation.106 In fact, depending on how requirements are written, they may actually 
impede innovation.107 Last, mandates usually establish a threshold which becomes the 
lowest common denominator that companies will meet but are unlikely to exceed.  
The disadvantages listed above can all be substantially reduced, although not 
entirely eliminated, through careful attention to the design of mandates. To improve 
effectiveness, necessary mandates must focus on outcomes and performance, instead of 
inputs and activities. Such a results-based approach can provide some measure of 
encouragement for organizations to be innovative while still attaining a given level of 
security.  
The various mandates discussed herein represent myriad ways in which 
preparedness measures have been imposed, or proposed, for various types of high-risk 
facilities. These approaches have their advantages and disadvantages. Distilling the 
effective parts of each effort is important since, in all likelihood, some mandates will be 
necessary in the development of a new policy to reduce the attractiveness of chemical 
facilities as targets for terrorists. However, even properly developed mandates are not 
enough. Efforts will need to focus on ways to motivate owners/operators of chemical 
facilities to willingly implement appropriate preparedness measures on their own.          
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When addressing homeland security issues, the conventional Washington wisdom 
is to search for an easy solution, often turning to regulating industries into compliance 
with new federal requirements.108 However, homeland security requires a multifaceted 
strategy to prevent, protect against and respond to 21st century threats. Mandates tend to 
lose utility with the passage of time, since they are generally static versus the 
evolutionary nature of threats. To stay a step ahead of adversaries, efforts must be more 
flexible and adaptive. But despite their disadvantages, regulations will likely be a 
necessary component, not the cornerstone of a holistic approach to chemical facility 
preparedness. They can be effective to a point, if properly designed and implemented.  
In addition to mandates, incentives could be used to reduce the attractiveness of 
chemical facilities as targets of attack. Developed in cooperation with stakeholders, these 
powerful instruments can create a strong motivating force to encourage chemical facility 
officials to voluntarily improve their sites’ preparedness. Incentives for owners/operators 
of chemical plants may take various forms. For example, “On any CEO’s wish list of 
outcomes from a proactive security strategy are lower insurance premiums, reduced legal 
liability, decreased tax liability, safe-harbor provisions, recognition from the government 
and its private sector peers, enhanced reputation, and reduced incident response and 
recovery costs.”109 Some of these carrots are currently in use to a limited extent in the 
chemical industry. The remaining ones have been successfully utilized in other critical 
infrastructure sectors to improve their preparedness.  
The desired outcomes mentioned above are the intended results of various 
disconnected initiatives. No overarching strategy connects them. Current sector efforts 
include industry trade association initiatives, federal outreach programs, grants and tax 
credits. Also, some insurance incentives and liability protection measures are utilized to 
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motivate chemical site owners/operators to implement added safeguards. Reviewing these 
approaches and evaluating their effectiveness may provide direction for how to improve 
chemical facility preparedness. Illustrations of each are provided below for review.               
B. INDUSTRY TRADE ASSOCIATIONS   
Strengthening chemical plant protection using incentives such as enhanced 
industry reputation, reduced incidence response time and costs, lowered liability exposure 
and decreased recovery costs generally occurs via membership in trade associations. 
Currently, the most popular and recognized organization is the American Chemistry 
Council (ACC). Plant officials who agree to join the ACC must adhere to its Responsible 
Care Code program’s self-initiated set of requirements. Among other things, the program 
calls for companies to assess their vulnerabilities and develop appropriate action/response 
plans. As a result, preparedness at members’ sites is improved. In addition, companies 
reduce their legal liability exposure and they potentially lower their recovery costs in the 
event of a disaster. Even so, the Responsible Care Code program has two key 
shortcomings. First, the initiative’s membership includes only a small portion (10%) of 
the universe of chemical facilities.110 It also lacks fixed metrics and standards for quality 
control.111 
While chemical facilities belong to other trade associations, evidence suggests 
that many sites are still inadequately protected. In fact, according to the Department of 
Homeland Security, approximately 20% of the overall sector believed to be at high-risk 
does not subscribe to any voluntary industry security standards.112 In addition, testimony 
by industry observers and policymakers supports this position. Even representatives from 
the ACC publicly recognize that voluntary efforts will not sufficiently protect facilities 
and now seek federal legislation for the industry. Many experts have concluded that the 
risk of a terrorist attack at a chemical site is insufficient to motivate plant 
owners/operators to voluntarily join industry safeguard programs.  
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Two primary reasons impact why voluntary initiatives alone will likely never lead 
to the kind of chemical facility preparedness that is necessary. First, most plant managers 
worry that implementing protective measures will put them at a competitive 
disadvantage. Second, unique issues associated with industry-driven efforts determine 
adequate security.  
Security is not free, and it is generally not cheap. Significant costs will be borne. 
If a company does not believe other facilities will or are able to make similar 
investments, it faces the likelihood of losing market share while displacing the industry’s 
vulnerabilities somewhere else. Furthermore, if terrorists attack chemical sites, the 
security investing facility will incur the same disruptive consequences of a strike right 
alongside those companies that did nothing to prevent it. As a result, chemical facility 
protection suffers from the dilemma frequently referred to as the “tragedy of the 
commons.” An example may help explain this concept.  
One day a chemical facility operator decides to implement certain security 
measures that require an increase in product cost by $10 per widget. Other competitors, 
however, decide not to make the same investment. As a result, competitors are able to 
attract market share away from the security conscious plant because of their lower prices. 
In addition, terrorists desiring to strike this sector will likely choose to attack the 
competitors since they are “softer” targets. If the attack is successful, its consequences 
will not be limited to just the low-cost operations. The impacts will likely be felt by all 
facilities. For example, insurance costs across the board will probably increase and stiff 
legislation for the entire sector may be forthcoming. Other disruptive economic 
repercussions will in all probability ripple through the entire chemical industry.          
Even if the “tragedy of the commons” dilemma could be resolved, the industry 
still faces unique uncertainty when trying to determine an acceptable level of security. 
Protective measures usually follow the rule of diminishing returns (i.e., greater 
investments purchase marginally less additional security). Therefore, at some point, a 
cost-benefit decision has to be made. Determining the costs of protective measures is 
relatively easy. However, calculating the benefits is much more elusive. To properly 
accomplish this task, accurate threat information is needed. Typically that kind of 
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information is tightly controlled by government officials, and it is frequently non-
specific. Because of this situation, chemical facility operators are simply left to make 
their best guess regarding how much protection to invest in. Clearly this situation is less 
than ideal for determining how limited preparedness funds should be invested.    
C. BUFFER ZONE PROTECTION PROGRAM GRANT 
A federal initiative aimed at strengthening safeguards at selected chemical 
facilities is the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Buffer Zone Protection 
Program (BZPP). Through the BZPP, DHS works with local law enforcement officials 
and facility owners to improve the security of the area surrounding a site or “outside the 
fence.”113 This program intends to improve the security of the area, making it more 
difficult for terrorists to conduct surveillance or to execute an attack. As a result, the 
implemented security measures create a “buffer zone” to further protect a facility. The 
added protection also generates other benefits. For example, plant officials lower both 
their insurance costs and legal liability exposure. 
A DHS team of subject matter experts (SMEs) initiates the BZPP process with a 
technical assistance visit to a high-risk chemical facility. High-risk sites are defined as 
those that, if attacked, could cause death or serious injury to 50,000 or more people.114 
Nationwide, DHS has identified 259 such facilities. Although SMEs are deployed by 
DHS, they are drawn from government and industry. Members posses extensive 
experience in areas such as physical security measures, system interdependencies and 
terrorist attack planning. The team begins their work by evaluating a site’s vulnerabilities, 
as well as the neighboring community’s capability to prevent and to respond to an attack. 
Next, current threat information is shared with company officials and vulnerability 
reduction measures are suggested. The DHS team then brings together the appropriate 
local emergency response officials and trains them regarding how to assess buffer zone 
security and identify measures to mitigate vulnerabilities.115 This process typically lasts 
one to two days.  
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Afterwards, local emergency response officials perform an assessment of the 
buffer zone and describe desired protective measures to strengthen the area. All of this 
information is recorded in a Buffer Zone Protection Plan and sent to DHS for review. If 
DHS approves the plan, federal funding assistance is provided to local emergency 
response officials to acquire and implement identified protective measures. Generally, the 
maximum award is $50,000 per high-risk chemical facility.    
The BZPP produces several favorable outcomes. First, the program implements 
additional security steps at participating sites, improving their preparedness. Furthermore, 
costs of the new safeguards are partially or totally offset by federal funding thus 
stretching scarce private sector resources. Second, according to DHS officials, the 
collaborative process helps facilitate relationships between owners/operators and the 
various response and law enforcement entities in the community.116 As a result, lines of 
communication have opened up. Third, facility personnel and local officials are advised 
of relevant threats to their sites and both parties receive valuable training with respect to 
assessing and addressing vulnerabilities. These advantages are likely to sustain 
stakeholders’ participation for the long-term. Finally, the BZPP is part of a layered 
approach. It is one of the few initiatives that looks outside the fences of facilities.   
There are, however, a few disadvantages of the Buffer Zone Protection Program. 
For example, it only applies to 259 chemical facilities, a small fraction of the 15,000 
RMP facilities that exist. Second, the BZPP primarily focuses on measures to protect the 
area surrounding a site. Little attention is concentrated on steps to safeguard, or reduce, 
the attractiveness of a facility’s interior where the most damage often can occur. Not all 
attacks need to be launched from outside the gates of a facility. To illustrate, a terrorist 
working as a facility employee or security guard would likely not be deterred by a BZPP. 
Third, the program relies heavily on the voluntary participation of site owners/operators. 
In fact, without their permission, DHS has no legal right to enter their facilities to 
conduct the BZPP. Furthermore, DHS personnel can ask but generally not demand 
BZPP-related records or information from plant officials. Some company executives are 
hesitant to share sensitive documents with DHS because they are concerned about 
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information security and protection. Others worry that the BZPP data may expose costly 
vulnerabilities that facility managers are unable or unwilling to address. As a result, if 
attacked, this situation could lead to additional liability for the participating facility.                                
D. INSURANCE MEASURES 
In most developed nations, one of the principle tools used by organizations for 
managing risk is insurance.117 Indeed, insurance is a key mechanism for aiding in 
recovery after a disaster and ensuring social and economic continuity. It played a pivotal 
role following the 9/11 attacks. Two-thirds of the $33 billion in insured losses from the 
disaster were paid by reinsurance companies that operate at a larger level worldwide.118 
A well-functioning insurance market is also critical to preventing or mitigating losses 
from catastrophes. This protection is most often achieved by offering insurance discounts 
for the implementation of certain preparedness measures. To illustrate, the insurance 
industry drove municipalities toward stricter building codes and a focus on fire 
prevention rather than only responding to fires.119 In exchange, lower fire ratings were 
provided to cities which reduced their residents’ premium costs. Ultimately, fires, fire 
damages and lives lost in fires all slowly declined.  
Currently, several forces require or encourage facility owners/operators to 
purchase insurance. First, various government agencies mandate sites to carry a minimum 
level of protection. Usually, periodic inspections or audits are conducted to ensure 
compliance. Fines are levied and/or operating permits revoked for violations. Second and 
to a lesser extent, employee groups, shareholders, trade associations, customers and other 
stakeholders also pressure plant officials to purchase insurance coverage. Each has a 
vested interest in trying to prevent or minimize the damage a disaster. Collectively, these 
parties are primarily responsible for why each chemical facility carries its current level of 
insurance.  
For insurance to be an effective tool for managing risk associated with acts of 
terrorism at chemical facilities, a properly functioning private market is necessary. 
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Critical to the long-term health of the private market are incentives. They encourage and 
sustain preparedness-related behaviors. However, many experts agree that under current 
conditions, private markets by themselves do not generate sufficient incentives for 
homeland security.120 Several conditions support this belief. 
• The costs of a terrorist attack will likely extend well beyond the immediate 
areas and people affected (e.g., negative externalities). Organizations 
seeking to protect themselves will generally not take these “extra” costs 
into account and subsequently undertake less investment in safeguards 
than socially desirable.    
• A terrorist attack imposes “contamination effects.” These complications 
arise when a catastrophic risk faced by one organization is determined in 
part by the behavior of others, and the behavior of these others affects the 
incentives of the first firm to reduce its exposure to the risk.  
• When trying to prepare for terrorist attacks, a frequently asked question is 
How much is enough? To answer this question, specific threat information 
is needed but details are often vague. Even if known, the intelligence is 
generally tightly held by government officials. This situation sets the stage 
for poor decision-making regarding what safeguards to implement.          
• A major terrorist attack is likely to cause losses beyond a firm’s net asset 
value. These costs are inherently limited by bankruptcy laws. As a result, 
an organization has little incentive to take total losses into account. 
Consequently, only measures to prevent losses up to bankruptcy limits 
will be implemented.   
• Some in the private sector now believe that the government will bail them 
out should a catastrophic terrorist attack occur. They point to the financial 
assistance provided to the airline industry after 9/11 as one such example. 
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This belief creates a “moral hazard” problem—firms expecting to be 
bailed out by government will undertake fewer safeguards than advisable.  
• Under current conditions, imperfections exist in the insurance market. For 
example, after 9/11 terrorism insurance became extremely expensive. For 
some, it was not even available. Mostly this shortage was due to the fact 
that insurance firms were unable to obtain reinsurance coverage. If 
insurance firms are unable to transfer a portion of their risk, they are 
unlikely to insure risky assets.121  
For the reasons described above, private markets by themselves fail to provide 
adequate incentives to support comprehensive homeland security efforts at chemical 
facilities. In fact, many of the stated shortcomings actually serve to discourage plant 
owners/operators from purchasing sufficient insurance protection or implementing other 
appropriate preparedness measures than what is socially desirable. Left alone, the private 
market is unlikely to overcome these barriers.   
According to The National Strategy For Homeland Security, “The government 
should only address those activities that the market does not adequately provide—for 
example, national defense or border security… For other aspects of homeland security, 
sufficient incentives exist in the private market to supply protection. In these cases we 
should rely on the private sector.”122 Based on the evidence listed above, it appears that 
private markets themselves do not produce appropriate incentives for homeland security. 
Private markets have an important role to play, but government intervention in some form 
will be necessary to fashion the proper response to the threat of terrorism.123      
Insurance can be an extremely powerful tool for strengthening homeland security 
if properly crafted and supported. Indeed, insurance has the potential to overcome the 
aforementioned shortcomings. There are at least two ways this can be achieved----with 
sticks or carrots. For example, legislation can be enacted to force facilities to purchase a 
given level of insurance. Another possible alternative is a regional insurance 
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requirement.124 This would be a geographically established and specific approach that 
would provide adequate incentives to local facilities to overcome private market 
inefficiencies. As opposed to applying a “one size fits all” approach characteristic of 
regulations, elements of an insurance requirement can vary in order to tailor it for 
geographical areas. For example, regions could craft insurance incentives (e.g., premium 
discounts for added measures), conduct third-party insurance inspections/audits, establish 
minimum insurance coverage and deductible levels, provide necessary reinsurance and 
serve as an insurer of last resort. In addition, a reasonable level of regional 
indemnification could be provided, similar to the Good Samaritan protection, should 
agreed upon measures be found wanting following a terrorist attack.125 All of these steps 
could help to modify incentives so that private markets sufficiently encourage chemical 
facility owners/operators to undertake reasonable preparedness efforts.  
An insurance requirement is not a panacea. There are other shortcomings to using 
this tool. Despite the disadvantages of using insurance to improve chemical facility 
preparedness, it is plausible that a broader system of anti-terrorism insurance could be 
developed regionally and thereby play a crucial role in providing incentives to private 
sector firms to implement adequate security measures.126 
E. TAX PROVISIONS 
Many experts suggest socializing some of the costs related to reducing the 
attractiveness of chemical facilities as targets of terrorism.127 For example, partial 
government funding for preparedness measures could serve as an incentive to subsidize 
enhanced preparedness efforts by plant owners/operators.128 Currently, the Prevent Act 
of 2003 accomplishes this function but on a limited basis. The Act allows for a business 
tax credit of up to twenty percent for the purchase and implementation of security devices 
and a thirty percent credit for assessments and other expenses incurred while improving 
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security.129 These tax breaks create a win-win situation for consumers and 
manufacturers.130 The provisions reduce the financial burden of plant officials to improve 
their sites’ protection while at the same time strengthening homeland security for the 
public.  
The Prevent Act is primarily directed at “add on” technology to increase security. 
Its focus is on offsetting the costs of purchasing biometric equipment, closed-circuit 
television and other defensive-related items to fortify locations. Unfortunately, more 
robust preparedness measures that would reduce the attractiveness of sites for acts of 
terrorism are not eligible for the tax credit. Some in chemical sector promote the idea of 
using tax incentives, like the Prevent Act, to reward facility owners/operators who adopt 
less dangerous processes for making, handling and storing the most lethal chemicals.131 
Other suggestions include using tax credits to improve warning and mitigation systems. 
In addition, subsidizing joint training, tabletop exercises and simulations are possible 
considerations.  
Government funding of preparedness measures could affect the behavior of 
chemical facility operators/owners and, if properly designed, provide some protection 
against terrorist threats.132 This form of government intervention, however, brings with it 
four dangers: 
• They can encourage unnecessarily expensive investments in security 
measures (e.g., “gold plating”).  
• This approach may initiate heated political and lobbying attempts that 
could undermine its intended purpose. 
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• Tax breaks could provide benefits to facilities that possibly would have 
implemented the measures even in the absence of the subsidy. 
• Funding provided from general revenue is effectively paid for by the 
entire population which some say is unfair and not feasible.133            
If tax incentives are used to improve the preparedness of chemical facilities from 
acts of terrorism, it will likely take a concerted effort to develop and implement an 
effective system that overcomes the listed dangers. Public-private partnerships will be 
critical in that effort. Stakeholders with expertise in various areas, working in a 
transparent environment towards a common goal, could craft a tax incentive policy to 
reduce their region’s attractiveness of chemical facilities as targets of terrorism.          
F. MISCELLANEOUS PROGRAMS 
Another potentially powerful incentive to improve chemical facility preparedness 
is the SAFETY Act. This provision currently provides a liability “safe-harbor” for sellers 
and consumers of certified anti-terror products and services. This certification is awarded 
by DHS only after conducting a rigorous evaluation process. To qualify, test results must 
demonstrate that technologies and services are both valid and effective with respect to 
strengthening homeland security. By purchasing SAFETY Act certified items and 
services, buyers receive immunity from lawsuits while they enhance their security. Many 
believe the SAFETY Act is particularly relevant for the chemical sector, as it provides an 
incentive to facility owners to invest in their own security.134  
However, like the Prevent Act, the SAFETY Act primarily focuses on 
encouraging security upgrades. Some have suggested that it could be extended to other 
products and services that would better prepare chemical sites against acts of terrorism. 
Extending the SAFETY Act is something Secretary Chertoff has repeatedly committed to 
doing.135 To this end, collaborative preparedness efforts can help. Stakeholders could 
serve as a filter for DHS to identify and test various products and services that would 
reduce the attractiveness of chemical facilities within their geographical region.      
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Currently, federal outreach programs are used on a limited basis as an incentive to 
motivate chemical plant owners/operators to improve their sites’ preparedness for attack. 
A site visit by DHS usually initiates this effort. To prioritize sites, DHS has separated 
nation’s 15,000 RMP facilities into four tiers using its own metrics. In the top two tiers 
there are 272 high-risk facilities.136 For now, outreach programs focus on these plants. 
While on-scene at high-risk locations, federal representatives use their expertise 
and threat knowledge to perform site assessments. Afterwards, they suggest to plant 
managers measures to reduce their vulnerabilities. Currently, these “inside-the-fence” 
assessments have been performed at 38 of the highest consequence facilities.137 It is the 
intent of DHS that through the outreach process, its recommendations are eventually 
acted upon, thus improving chemical facility security.   
Federal outreach programs could serve as one component in a broader system of 
incentives to promote chemical facility preparedness. To achieve this outcome, some 
changes are needed to the current process. First, inspectors will need to visit facilities 
more quickly. DHS only plans to assess 50 plants in FY 2006.138 Even if this objective is 
reached, just 86 facilities will have been visited in the five years following 9/11. At that 
rate, it will take almost three more years to finish inspecting every top two tier plant, 
seeing all 15,000 RMP sites is not even a likely possibility. Second, facilities should be 
visited more often than just once. As threats evolve, so must preparedness measures. This 
necessitates periodically revisiting plants and meeting with personnel to ensure they are 
aware of relevant terrorist threats and their sites are adequately protected. However, 
under the current process, only one “lifetime” assessment is conducted.  
Using public-private partnerships can address both shortcomings mentioned 
above. For example, federal personnel can train stakeholders how to properly perform 
site assessments. Armed with this new knowledge, partnering members can then visit 
facilities within their regions to encourage owners/operators to improve their 
preparedness. In essence, partners will serve as an extension of DHS, allowing sites to be 
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visited more often and at a faster pace. This “train the trainer” approach should also help 
build strong local relationships and communication.                   
A yet-to-be-used incentive within the chemical industry involves publicly 
recognizing facility operators’/owners’ homeland security efforts. In other words, openly 
commend those plant officials that attain a given level of preparedness. This approach 
could encourage managers to improve their sites’ safeguards. In exchange, their 
reputation is enhanced, liability exposure reduced and insurance costs decreased.  
Recently, the DHS Homeland Security Advisory Council and the Council on 
Competitiveness called for a homeland security award for private industry akin to the 
prestigious Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award.139 Something similar could be 
achieved specifically for the chemical sector. To properly develop and implement this 
effort, public-private partnerships can be used. They could design a public recognition 
system that sufficiently rewards good performance by plant managers. In this way, 
industry will recognize the accomplishments of its own. This incentive would be just one 
more tool available to stakeholders to improve the preparedness of chemical facilities.       
G.  SUMMARY OF APPROACHES 
Even though some improvements in safeguards at chemical facilities have 
occurred, it does not appear that current voluntary efforts by themselves will lead to the 
kind of protection that is needed. Simply put, current free market forces alone are 
insufficient for strengthening homeland security. Something more is needed, however, 
the approaches described above can be useful. They will serve as templates for future 
chemical facility preparedness efforts by public-private partnerships. Evaluating both 
their advantages and disadvantages is beneficial. This process provides valuable clues on 
how to craft and sustain a model incentive system. In all likelihood incentives will play a 
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VI.  CONCLUSION  
A. POSITION 
This thesis presents two intertwined arguments. First, regional public-private 
partnerships can more effectively improve chemical facility preparedness than focusing 
on individual plant owner/operator efforts. Second, an approach using a mixture of 
mandates and incentives is better than relying on current corporate volunteerism or 
imposing specific legislative preparedness requirements for the industry. It is further 
argued that allowing regional stakeholders to develop, implement and sustain both 
mandates and incentives are optimal methods to ensure participant collaboration, policy 
flexibility and effective results. In essence, community governance of preparedness 
efforts in each region will lead to the best possible combination of outcomes. These 
claims are based on a study of industry characteristics and current voluntary preparedness 
programs, as well as a comparative analysis of mandated approaches used by federal, 
state and local governments. A review of how regulatory standards and enticements have 
been applied to other analogous problematic areas of federal responsibility provides 
further support.    
According to the findings of this thesis, it seems apparent that a different 
approach to reduce the attractiveness of chemical facilities as targets for terrorists is 
needed. Based on the strengths and weaknesses of the various methods and cases 
reviewed, a new policy utilizing a mixture of region-specific mandates (sticks) and 
incentives (carrots) may be more effective. The new proposal will need to engage key 
stakeholders through the use of public-private partnerships (PPPs). This method will 
encompass much more than just occasional meetings and luncheons. Partners must 
meaningfully provide their input into creating the proposed policy and actively take part 
in its implementation and execution. Participants will have to be cross-trained and given 
important roles and responsibilities in the new approach. Partners will also need to define 
desired regional outcomes and then identify activities that are likely to lead to them. 




proposal. Continuous benchmarking is a necessity. This kind of collaborative and results-
based system can ensure that the interests of participants are taken into consideration 
while still yielding effective results.  
As in any joint effort, the issue of assigning primary responsibility is likely to 
arise. Fortunately the available literature addresses this matter. For example, both the 
Department of Homeland Security and the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States promote the idea that the private sector should shoulder the bulk 
of responsibility for reducing the attractiveness of chemical facilities as targets of 
terrorism. In fact, the 9/11 Commission Report states this rationale is entirely appropriate 
since the private sector owns the vast majority of critical infrastructure which includes 
hazardous chemical facilities.140 Furthermore, according to the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, the private sector bears primary responsibility for protecting the 
public from the risks their facilities pose.141 However, with regard to assigning 
responsibility to the private sector, a consistent theme arises. The bulk of the literature 
advocates that the public and private sector should partner together to develop the most 
cost-effective and comprehensive plan. This sentiment is echoed in the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security.142 Moreover, HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, 
Prioritization, and Protection, promotes partnering by stating the Secretary of DHS “will 
work closely with other Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, 
and the private sector in accomplishing the objectives of this directive.”143 The big 
question is not if the two parties should join forces, but how their collective effort should 
be structured, what its focus should be, who specifically needs to participate, and what 
are their roles and responsibilities.  
In building the new partnerships, key stakeholders need to first be identified. 
Ideally, Department of Homeland Security personnel should formally initiate this task for 
several reasons. First, this office adds a measure of instant credibility to the proposed 
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policy, increasing the likelihood that others will voluntarily participate. For the most part, 
DHS has a good reputation within the chemical industry, as opposed to the adversarial 
relationship between the private sector and the EPA. Second, DHS has an extensive 
knowledge base of the chemical sector. Third, the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security states that the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating 
and integrating federal, state, local and private sector efforts.144 Last, the Department of 
Homeland Security is the lead federal agency for the chemical industry. Accordingly, it 
seems intuitive that DHS should take a leadership role in reaching out to major 
participants of the proposed policy.     
After the inclusion of the Department of Homeland Security, other principal 
parties likely to be involved in the suggested policy include emergency responders, 
environmentalists, insurance personnel, government employees, political leaders, 
industry association members, sector experts, key officials and citizens. These groups 
have the power, expertise, resources and networks necessary for the success of the 
proposed approach. Therefore, obtaining their active support is critical.     
The actual framework for how to incorporate representatives from each principal 
party into the proposed nationwide policy should be broken down into regions. For 
example, within a geographical area, DHS will map out the chemical facilities using 
information from the Environmental Protection Agency’s current Risk Management 
Plans and other source data. These selected sites, including their vulnerable zones, are 
then clustered together to form various regions. Next, Local Emergency Planning 
Committees (LEPCs), as well as representatives from the principal parties listed above 
who have jurisdictions or interests within a given region, will be drawn together by DHS 
officials to form a Regional Defense Unit (RDU). These members have general 
knowledge of the industry, are aware of the risks that chemical facilities pose, possess 
credibility and political clout within their communities and have a vested interest in 
making chemical facilities less attractive targets for terrorists.   
Representatives from the chemical industry will also be invited to join the RDU. 
These individuals have specific expertise, actual information about facilities/operations 
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and practicing knowledge of the industry that will be crucial to the success of the 
proposed policy. In all likelihood, industry representatives will accept the invitation 
because they have a strong reason to participate. The incentive is to ensure their facilities’ 
and industry’s interests are represented, while RDU mandates (sticks) and incentives 
(carrots), as explained below, are being promulgated. Industry representatives should 
recognize this opportunity and accept the invitation. However, if they choose not to 
participate, the consequences of doing so will vary depending on the exact requirements 
ultimately developed by the RDU. For example, RDU members may decide that non-
participants have to carry higher levels of insurance protection, not be eligible for tax 
breaks, have to pay higher fees, incur increased transaction costs, be inspected more 
often, have operating permits suspended or revoked, encounter slower government 
processing, etc.  
Industry officials could try to pursue legal action to prevent the RDU’s efforts. 
Although this avenue is a possibility, it is unlikely for two reasons. First, litigation will 
publicize the sector’s overall lax security as documented earlier. This deterrent, coupled 
with the fact that a catastrophic release at any one of thousands of chemical facilities 
would threaten large numbers of Americans, makes legal action less palatable for 
industry. Furthermore, news agencies would probably use the conflict to demonize the 
chemical sector. As a result, more severe action could be imposed on chemical facilities 
than what would have been produced had industry officials simply participated. Second, 
other local, county and state governments have initiated stronger actions (e.g., mandates) 
than suggested in the new policy, and no legal repercussions have occurred.  
Next, every RDU will perform a variety of tasks, such as categorizing regional 
facilities by risk, conducting appropriate vulnerability assessments, describing minimum-
security measures/standards, identifying adequate warning and mitigation systems, 
developing necessary requirements, etc. In addition, a major portion of the RDU’s efforts 
involves creating and structuring incentives to encourage additional preparedness efforts 
by facility owners/operators. To illustrate, what mix, if any, should there be regarding tax 
cuts, credits and abatements? Also, what about government-sponsored insurance, grants, 
and low interest loans? Can operating permit processes be expedited, costs reduced, 
number of inspections lowered and so on for compliant facilities? Another key area for 
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RDU members will be developing necessary preparedness-related mandates. For 
example, what are the minimum standards and safeguards needed to ensure adequate 
preparedness? These questions will need to be addressed by each RDU and evaluated 
from the viewpoint of promoting effective results, not merely causing activities to take 
place or “boxes to be checked.” Much of this work is likely to be long and tedious, but a 
properly balanced “carrot and stick” approach will be critical for the ultimate success of 
the new regional policy.   
To keep processes transparent and to reduce the chances that the RDU is co-
opted, periodic reports and public presentations must be made to governing bodies within 
the region. Also, a citizen oversight/accountability committee will be established to 
ensure efforts stay above board and on target. Another step involves creating an 
ombudsmen group to support the RDU by conducting research, providing technical 
assistance, identifying issues of interest, operating a “whistle blower” hotline and so 
forth. Lastly, a mediation body should be included to help resolve conflicts that may arise 
and to minimize potential litigation.   
In order to fund this policy, a tax or fee can be charged to facilities located in the 
geographical area of the RDU. The amount charged could be based on the classification 
of the site. For example, a plant may be charged a specific rate for storing, consuming, 
transporting or manufacturing certain hazardous chemicals. The amount could be 
established at a relatively low rate and be continuous, or set somewhat higher and 
stopped once sufficient operating capital for the new policy is amassed. Structuring costs 
in this fashion may encourage facilities to reduce their attractiveness as targets (e.g. store 
less volatile substances on-site, substitute hazardous chemicals with safer ones, reduce 
high-risk processes, etc.). Establishing a taxing entity within the RDU region represents 
another alternative. This option could involve setting up a general sales tax district or 
statewide tax whereby the revenue is used exclusively to secure nearby critical 
infrastructure such as chemical facilities. The RDU, with approval of DHS, can be 
responsible for determining how the collected funds are spent. Under this approach all 
that would be needed is a public referendum.        
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The suggested policy has several advantages. First, it initiates a comprehensive 
and cost-effective process for making chemical facilities less attractive as targets of 
terrorism. To date, this scenario has not occurred, and it appears unlikely, unless a 
catastrophic event at a plant occurs. Second, the strategy establishes an ongoing structure 
that facilitates the active participation of key members of the private and public sector 
towards a common goal. It does this through a mixed approach of mandates (sticks) and 
incentives (carrots). Currently, no other similar method is available. Third, the new policy 
focuses on addressing key issues that most observers agree need to be resolved. Many of 
these problems have existed within the chemical sector for years. Fourth, the proposal is a 
networked and layered approach to the problem of chemical facility “insecurity.” 
Because of the multi-disciplinary makeup of the RDU, measures will not be considered in 
a vacuum but in concert with other dynamics. This holistic view is possible when key 
members of all parties gather together and strive towards one common mission. With 
stakeholders working side by side, results should be produced quicker, saving valuable 
resources. Furthermore, innovation is more likely to occur in this atmosphere. Buy-in and 
industry adherence with the new jointly developed policies should be higher than with a 
strictly mandated approach. For example, strong public-private collaboration was used in 
drafting the FFIEC regulatory handbook, which is broadly recognized by the banking 
industry for its value.145 However, the EPA’s Underground Storage Tank (UST) 
program, which regulates leak detection and prevention in tanks, was developed with 
little external input. To no surprise, more than 60% of states cannot inspect facilities in 
adherence with EPA’s UST guidelines due to understaffing.146 Considering the scarcity 
of resources for enforcement, regulations that lack sector buy-in are generally less 
effective.  
The suggested policy also establishes permanent structures that will allow for 
continuous evaluation and improvement, what the Japanese call “kaizen”. It will not 
dissolve, as government committees or commissions often do, after their initial work is 
completed. As a result of sustaining the new approach, it can be adapted to meet new 
                                                 
145  National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Best Practices For Government To Enhance The 
Security Of National Critical Infrastructures, Final Report And Recommendations By The Council, April 
13, 2004, 14. 
146  Ibid.  
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threats. This characteristic is beneficial because as threats constantly emerge and evolve, 
so must the proposal. Another advantage of the proposal is the design of the self-funding 
mechanism, requiring appropriate parties to incur the costs. Last, since stakeholders are 
working more closely together, coordination, cooperation and collaboration should be 
high. In summary, the suggested policy is likely to produce more cost-effective and 
comprehensive results than voluntary or mandated alternatives will yield.  
Just as there are many advantages to the suggested policy, there are some 
disadvantages. For example, it does create another layer of “bureaucracy,” and this 
process could become mired in “turf battles.” In addition, operating costs will likely 
increase which may have unforeseen rippling effects. The suggested strategy also 
infringes on the free market enterprise by imposing government intervention. Historically 
the results have not been efficient or effective when this has happened. Another problem 
is that developing, implementing and sustaining the new proposal will consume 
participants’ time, and quite a bit of it. There will be meetings, training, research, 
reporting, planning and so forth. Obviously, accomplishing this “new” work may cause 
efforts in other areas to suffer. Finally, suggested incentives could become abused, either 
by illegal means or through a lobbying process and therefore undermine the suggested 
policy’s effectiveness. 
The proposal’s primary constraint is that while it is well suited for metropolitan 
areas where high-risk facilities are usually clustered together, it may not be as practical 
when sites are isolated or geographically dispersed. Also, the approach may run into 
political difficulties, especially when a region crosses several jurisdictional boundaries 
(cities, counties or states). This situation could make consensus building more difficult 
for DHS.  
If implemented, the proposal may have several unintended consequences. For 
example, in lieu of adhering to the new RDU regulations, some chemical facilities may 
decide to relocate overseas. This option would be more difficult for refineries because of 
their huge capital investments, but it could be easier for storage and transportation sites. 
In addition, industry growth within the identified region may be stifled. Plants may not 
expand and other multinational corporations could decide not to move their companies to 
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the U.S. because it may be viewed as “unfriendly” to the industry. Also, complying with 
the new policy could inadvertently bankrupt some already financially struggling 
facilities. All of these outcomes would have a negative effect. Another unintended 
consequence is that RDU members or other participants may become too close of allies to 
the very industry they are supposed to be overseeing. Last, the proposed approach might 
digress into a highly politicized process, potentially causing all parties to move further 
apart instead of bringing them closer together.    
If the proposal is adopted, clearly the chemical sector will lose some of its 
freedoms. The industry will no longer have carte blanch over its operations. Certain 
measures will have to be undertaken and some oversight will be instituted. Also, the 
suggested funding mechanism, fees, taxes, etc., for the proposal will likely impact 
corporate earnings. However, industry officials may be able to reduce some of their costs. 
For example, newly implemented security steps could be marketed by the chemical sector 
to demonstrate its “consumer consciousness.” Furthermore, the industry can offset its 
added preparedness costs of compliance by passing on the increases to customers and/or 
corporate investors (e.g., reduce dividends). Last, some of the sector’s increased 
expenditures may be partially or totally reduced by available tax credits, grants, insurance 
reductions, pooling of resources, etc.   
Initially, opponents of the chemical industry likely will be viewed as the winners 
in the adopted policy. But, in reality the collaboratively developed quasi-mandates 
implemented as a result of the proposal will not be nearly as rigid as federal legislation 
long suggested by some industry opponents. As mentioned earlier Governor Corzine, a 
harsh critic of the chemical industry, has long proposed a laundry list of specific 
regulations for its facilities (e.g., the Chemical Security Act).147 However, the steps 
offered under the new approach are more flexible, comprehensive and participatory than 
the CSA.  
If implemented, the public is the big winner of the suggested regional policy 
because effective steps will finally be taken to reduce the attractiveness of chemical sites 
as targets of terrorism. As a result, future attacks should be prevented or deterred and the 
                                                 
147 Corzine, “Agenda,” http://corzine.senate.gov/priorities/chem_sec.html (Accessed May 30, 2005). 
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consequences of successful strikes will be substantially mitigated. Both outcomes 
significantly improve homeland security.  As a result, all Americans will benefit.  
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Federal legislation should be enacted that authorizes the Department of Homeland 
Security to ensure that chemical facilities are adequately prepared against acts of 
terrorism. To achieve this goal, the new Act needs to assert that DHS forms regional 
public-private partnerships (e.g., Regional Defense Units). Eventually these collaborative 
groups will craft, implement and sustain both mandates and incentives to reduce the 
attractiveness of chemical facilities as targets of terrorism. In essence, much of the 
required effort of the new proposal will be, and should be, performed by Regional 
Defense Units, with guidance from DHS. However, before getting to these tasks, RDU 
members must perform some related groundwork. For example, once the RDUs are 
formed, they will conduct a variety of tasks such as: 
1. Action Steps 
• Identifying meaningful security measures  
• Crafting third-party inspections/audits procedures 
• Determining a tax/fee structure for the handling of certain hazardous materials 
• Identifying potential inherently safer technology alternatives 
• Establishing drill, training, and “red team” requirements  
• Submitting specified reports and appearing before local governing bodies 
• Reviewing facilities’ procedures/plans (safety, personnel, equipment, 
response, mitigation, etc.) to ensure preparedness adequacy  
• Establishing levels of insurance for the handling certain hazardous chemicals   
• Assessing facility vulnerabilities, based on recognized methodologies, and 
ensure steps to address weaknesses are implemented 
• Calculating realistic off-site consequences to categorize chemical sites based 
on risks 
• Establishing background check and periodic review procedures for employees  
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• Creating and implementing employee training to thwart  “social engineering” 
attacks 
• Determining eligibility for grants, tax credits, and/or fee reductions to 
encourage facilities to take extra protective measures 
• Providing expedited inspections/audits/reviews for facilities that exceed basic 
security expectations 
• Seeking representation on the region’s FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF) to ensure follow-up on homeland security matters and to improve 
communication 
• Developing and offering training for RDU members and facility personnel to 
improve preparedness   
• Leading an effort to establish a meaningful ongoing partnership between the 
private and public sectors 
• Collaborating and networking with neighboring RDUs to share lessons 
learned, best practices, intelligence, etc.   
It should be noted that the list above is not exhaustive nor are the tasks provided 
in order of importance. Once these and other action steps are complete, RDUs will craft 
and institute regional “carrot and stick” measures to ensure chemical facility 
owners/operators undertake adequate steps to improve their preparedness.     
The new approach can produce several positive outcomes. First, chemical 
facilities will become harder for terrorists to penetrate. The proposal should also deter 
attacks since suggested measures will significantly raise the odds that terrorists will not 
gain access. Second, RDU efforts are likely to reduce the high consequences commonly 
associated with an attack on the chemical sector. For example, some of the action steps 
specifically encourage chemical facility operators to store fewer quantities of hazardous 
materials on-site, use safer technology, improve response and mitigation efforts and shift 
towards substituting less lethal chemicals. Third, the new policy should pre-empt attacks 
at chemical facilities by improving terrorism recognition capabilities of law enforcement, 
chemical facility personnel and the general public. Finally, the suggested approach 
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encourages industry innovation through incentives to reduce the attractiveness of 
chemical facilities as targets for terrorists. All of these measures can strengthen the 
preparedness of the chemical industry. 
C. SUMMARY  
According to recent government reports, chemical facilities present desirable 
targets for terrorists.148 Their attractiveness is due to several factors. First, a catastrophic 
release of a toxic substance at a key facility could endanger the lives of millions of 
Americans. Second, in spite of the dangers of such an event, many sites are not 
adequately prepared. Third, terrorists could strike the chemical sector to send crippling 
reverberations through the economy or for symbolic purposes. For these reasons, 
chemical plants are prime terrorist targets. In fact, the seriousness of the chemical facility 
preparedness was recently highlighted by the former Deputy Homeland Security Advisor, 
Richard Falkenrath. In July of 2005, he stated before the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs: 
Of all the various remaining civilian vulnerabilities in America today, one 
stands alone as uniquely deadly, pervasive, and susceptible to terrorist 
attack: toxic-inhalation hazard (TIH) industrial chemicals, such as 
chlorine, ammonia, phosgene, methylbromide, hydrochloric acid and other 
various acids. The IDLS (immediately dangerous to life standard) for two 
of the most common industrial TIH chemicals, ammonia and chlorine, is 
500 and 10 parts per million, respectively. These are extraordinarily 
dangerous substances: they are identical to those used as weapons on the 
Western Front during the First World War.149  
To prevent terrorist attacks and to mitigate the consequences of successful attacks 
on the chemical industry, efforts need to focus on reducing the attractiveness of its 
facilities as targets. Achieving this monumental goal requires a comprehensive, cost-
effective, and collaborative approach. It also necessitates DHS to demonstrate real 
leadership and for stakeholders to be actively engaged in preparedness efforts. 
Consequently, a new proposal should be developed, implemented and sustained by 
regional public-private partnerships. Through joint efforts (e.g., regional governance) and 
 
                                                 
148 Stephenson, “Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way”, 3.  
149 Richard A Falkenrath, Chemical Facility Security: What Is The Appropriate Federal Role? 
Statement before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, April 27, 2005, 9. 
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by using a mixture of incentives and government mandates, chemical facilities can 
become better prepared for attacks. These requirements are all pillars of the proposed 
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